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ABSTRACT
Forward deployed naval forces are expected to remain the principal military
option for underscoring U.S. foreign policy objectives abroad. But as the numbers
of deployable ships decline, keeping adequate numbers of U.S. Navy forces deployed
will become increasingly difficult. Since no nation possesses unlimited resources,
determining the correct number, capability, and mix of warships is extremely
difficult, if not impossible. As large numbers of expensive combatants become
difficult to budget, they become, in a sense perhaps, "irreplaceable," a liability which
can outweigh their unparalleled capabilities. Small, 1,500 ton corvettes offer a
supplement by way of their ability to apply "appropriate naval force at the decisive
point, at the decisive moment."
Although small combatants are not part of present American naval strategy,
this thesis concludes that such corvettes can contribute efficiently to several of the
roles and forward presence missions of the future. This conclusion is based on three
interrelated factors: national strategy, fiscal constraints, and emerging or anticipated
technologies. A flotilla of small combatants would be a complementary supplement
to the combatant fleet of 2010, sustaining our tactical advantage and strategic
commitment as a world leader. The penalty of building only large and expensive
warships could be inadequate numbers for success in war availability in peace.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Forward deployed naval forces are expected to remain the principal military
option for underscoring U.S. foreign policy objectives abroad. This expectation is
based not only on the continuing drawdown of "fixed" American forces abroad, but
also in recognition of the unique and attractive nature of naval forces, including:
flexibility, responsiveness, endurability, and recallability. But as the numbers of
deployable ships decline, keeping the forward deployment of adequate numbers of
U.S. Navy forces will become increasingly difficult. So-called "adaptive force
packages" are an attempt to solve part of the problem, yet some theater coverage is
increasingly being "gapped."
Since no nation possess unlimited resources, determining the correct number,
capability, and mix of warships is extremely difficult, if not impossible. Part of the
dilemma centers around the question of quality vs. quantity, most notably how to
build, maintain, and operate extremely capable and expensive ships, adequate in
number to persevere during conflict, while also having enough ships to accomplish a
myriad of peacetime commitments.
As large numbers of expensive combatants become less affordable and, in a
sense perhaps, "irreplaceable," their liabilities can outweigh their unparalleled
capabilities. The high cost of procurement can influence the nation's willingness to
take risks, and thereby present the operational commanders with a dilemma: how to
fight for sea control while preserving at all costs, the "irreplaceable handful o( capital
vm
ships. Small, 1,500 ton corvettes can offer a solution by way of their ability to apply
"appropriate naval force at the decisive point, at the decisive moment."
Although small combatants are not part of present American naval strategy,
this thesis concludes that small corvettes, operating together as a flotilla, can reliably
perform several of the roles and forward presence missions of the future. This
conclusion is based on three interrelated factors: national strategy, fiscal constraints,
and emerging or anticipated technologies.
Recognizing that the military potential and character of the force obviously
influences and, at times, dictates mission success, the thesis demonstrates how a
flotilla, postulated to consist of eight 1,500 ton corvettes and a mothership, can
contribute to or reinforce American commitment abroad. This contribution balances
several goals which seem important to the Nation as a whole, to sustain American
military tactical advantage and strategic commitment as a world leader.
Technological innovation makes this possible as it has overcome much of the straight-
line relationship between size, capability, and cost. By incorporating offship sensor
nets (SEW and UAVs), sophisticated tactical data systems (TDS), and enhanced
weapon suites, the future corvette can overcome many of the shortcomings
presently associated with small ships. By contrast, the penalty of building only
capital warships of DDG size and larger could be too few for success in war or
availability in peace.
Port calls and multi-national exercises are indicators of goodwill, friendship,
and cooperation, but when national resolve or capability are perceived to be weak,
IX
then forward deployed forces may encounter challenges. In this light, the flotilla is
viewed as a fighting force that signals an appreciation of the needs and realities of
the future, and demonstrates that the United States desires to remain globally
engaged. The corvette is intended to steam in front, leading the fight in littoral
waters. The dispersion of the flotilla spreads the risk to the corvette force, a factor
which could prove invaluable in a scenario where the probability of loss to mines,
surprise ASCM attack, or submarine torpedoes is high. The flotilla can be a force
multiplier, augmenting the CINCs concentration of forces in both time and space.
I. INTRODUCTION
What we are trying to do is to find ways in which our nation may match our
responsibilities as a nation. ..The job before all of us today is to learn the ins and outs of
power and policy, so that our nation's intentions and the capacities to achieve these
intentions may be brought into balance. 1
After decades of "containment" and global vigilance, the Cold War's cessation
portends new hopes and visions for the United States. Unlike after Versailles, Yalta,
or Potsdam, no reparations, no occupations, and no massive efforts are required to
rebuild entire nations. The Nation is able to redirect efforts and energies towards
new challenges and opportunities, and if necessary, shift priorities.
This thesis concentrates on one aspect of national power, the utilization of
naval force in underscoring foreign policy. Specifically the thesis proposes that the
Navy can use relatively small surface combatants, "corvettes," to help carry out
"forward presence" roles and missions.
The strategy for examining this proposition is modelled around projected
United States' national interests in 2010. The time frame is chosen primarily because it
provides the long lead time that is normally required to turn the warship designer's
"gleam in the eye" into an operational weapon system. Ideally, if the strategy is
correct, it should influence ship design and acquisition, but unfortunately, the
process is more complex: technology can influence strategy, as can tactics. Similarly,
agreed tactics can shape technical choices.
'Gaddis, J. L., Strategies of Containment, p. 126, Oxford University Press, 1982.
A quote during the Cold War by Dean Acheson to National War College students.
The Bottom Up Review (BUR) has called for a reassessment of the new era,
the development of a new naval strategy, and a general re-structuring of U.S. armed
forces.
2 This re-structuring of the forces, tactics, and training, to meet the threats of
the future, is difficult considering the uncertainty of "the threat," decreasing defense
budgets, diverse operational requirements, and complicated national priorities. The
planner must shed conventional wisdoms and biases, which in this case includes re-
examining the question if smaller, less detectable, and less expensive ships, can be
used in lieu of "high end" warships, to effectively conduct presence.
In the end, the strategic interests are juxtaposed with the capabilities of the
corvette in an effort to determine if, where, and when corvette flotillas may be
applicable. The goal is to find a balance between requirements, capability and
affordability. Figure 1 highlights the framework from which the suitability and
potential contribution of corvettes is to be assessed.
2
U.S. Department of Defense, Aspin, L., Secretary of Defense, The Bottom-Up
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Figure 1: The corvette's strategic context
The first question that emerges when considering a corvette-size ship, is how
can it contribute or reinforce American commitment abroad; when the military
potential and the character of the force obviously influences and, at times, dictates
mission success?
First, technological innovation has overcome the old adage that low cost or
light displacement equate to low striking power. Corvettes offer an adaptive
package, expressly tailored to perform on the littorals. Not only do the ships
represent American commitment to certain regions, but they can increase the range
of available options. Their relatively low cost ($200 million) can provide the Nation
with the necessary flexibility in numbers, visibility, capability, and response to prevail
in the twenty-first century.
Second, corvettes exploit the influential intent behind presence. It must be
remembered that presence, to be effective, requires "keeping and exploiting the
initiative, by allowing the force conducting them much more latitude to decide the
time, place, and nature of the combat, vice simply responding to attacks."3 This
requires ships designed for a myriad of missions and with an increasing emphasis on
the word "cost effectiveness." Fiscal concerns are expected to intensify, and corvettes
offer a solution without sacrificing the strategic intent or unacceptable tactical
advantage.
Third, renewed emphasis on "green water" warfare significantly alters the
calculus of presence, and the projection of power ashore may need to take place in a
very demanding environment. Planners must not lose sight of this, as the essence of a
warship remains its capability to seize, control, and deny. This can not be taken for
granted in littoral waters, where naval forces may find themselves heavily
contested, perhaps even outgunned initially.
Change is ften resisted, for instance the British Admiralty reluctantly made
the transition from sail to steam, wood to iron or steel, coal to oil, and paddles for
propellers, with great reluctance.4 To have done otherwise would have rendered the
Royal Navy obsolete.
3
Till, Geoffrey, Modern Sea Power, vol. 1, p. 63, Royal Naval College, Brassey's
Defence Publishers, London, 1987. Describing a view held by former Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) Admiral Hayward, concerning the forward operations.
4Griffen, Admiral Sir Anthony, The Future of British Sea Power, "Weapons and
Platforms," p.223, edited Geoffrey Till, Naval Institute Press, 1984.
A. MISSION FORWARD PRESENCE
Forward presence has been a fundamental element of the national military
strategy since the end of World War II, but only recently, since the end of the Cold
War, has it been formally identified as a critical strategic mission/ The concept
means different things to different people, but has generally referred to the stationing
or rotational deployment of troops, aircraft, or naval forces abroad, in the furtherance
of a nation's foreign policy. Occasional port visits are also manifestations of
presence. The basic modern motivations behind the idea are similar to Pax-Romana
or Pax-Britannica, when military forces were deployed beyond national borders to
symbolize and reinforce their interest(s) in a particular region.
Forward presence is one means by which the United States demonstrates its
national interests and its obligations as a world leader. Presence is dynamic, and can
shift between several variations, depending on the circumstances. Today, presence
appears to be shifting from the "fixed" deployment of ground and air forces, to a
greater reliance on forces of a "variable" nature. At times, this presence, with its
implied threat of military violence, is latent; at other times, it is active.
"President of the United States, The White House, National Security Strategy of
the United States, Washington, DC, January 1993. Four post-Cold War missions were
identified: Besides "presence," the other three include: "Strategic deterrence" referring
to the maintenance oi a balanced deterrent force with both strategic and tactical
offensive strategic capabilities, "crisis response" referring to a capability to respond to
two simultaneous crises in widely separated regions, and "reconsritution" which
refers to the ability to rebuild both the military and defense industries. The Bottom
up Review, p.7, also cites presence as a "joint mission " area.
To be effective, presence entails two essentials. The first requires prioritizing
among national goals, for each region poses peculiar threats, challenges, and
volatilities. The second obviously requires that the military capability be adequate to
the political tasking. As Table 1 depicts, this in itself is no easy task in light of the
broad range of maritime missions which presence may be called to support.
TABLE 1: TYPICAL MARITIME MISSIONS
1. Diplomatic reassurances (port visits)
2. Multi-national maritime cooperation (exercises)
3. Non-traditional (freedom of navigation, environmental, piracy, mass migration
by sea, peacekeeping (PK), humanitarian)
4. Surveillance
5. Escort
6. Visit, board, search, inspect (VBSI)
7. Rescue personnel abroad (NEO)
8. Maritime embargo / quarantine
9. Safeguard seaborne trade and replenishment
10. Battle space management (BSM)
B. UNITED STATES NAVY CONSIDERATIONS
Until the War of 1812, American trade in the Mediterranean Sea was
precipitous at best, as mariners faced not only the normal hazards of operating on the
high seas, but also the continual harassment to ship and crew from the pirates along
the Barbary coast oi North Africa. After three American administrations, President
Madison recognized that various degrees of appeasement and coercion had failed,
and decided that enough was enough. The Nation leased a port on the island of
Majorca, and dispatched a small American flotilla with orders to protect American
interests in the region. 6 The plundering eventually came to a halt.
Since those days there have been frequent occasions for deploying American
naval forces to various localities abroad. Tomorrow's naval forces are expected to
remain the principal military option for underscoring U.S. foreign policy objectives
abroad. 7 This assumption is based on the continuing drawdown of American
ground forces abroad/ and in recognition of the unique and attractive nature of
naval forces, including: flexibility, responsiveness, endurability, and recallability.
To provide an idea of the scope of the presence which naval forces contribute
today, consider a recent one-day snapshot:
December 1, 1993 — 426 ship navy
194 Ships underway (45%) 12 Exercises in 10 countries
83 Ships deployed (20%) Port visits to 12 countries4
bLaFeber, W., The American Age, United States Foreign Policy at Home and
Abroad Since 1750, p.52, Norton and Co., 1989.
Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War, p.55-56, Brookings Institute,
Washington, 1978. The authors looked at 215 incidents in which the United States
utilized armed force (including demonstrations) for political objectives between
January 1, 1946 to December 31, 1975. During this time, naval units participated in
over 2/3 of the incidents.
^Boatman, J., "Frontline Bases Form Bulk of U.S. Base Closures," Tane's Defence
Weekly, p. 11, 10 July 1993. For example over 840 sites have been returned to host
governments since 1990.
"OPNAV, N51, POM briefing to the Secretary of the Navy, February 19, 1994.
Add the following 1993 aggregates: port visits to 85 nations and 168 naval exercises
conducted with 53 different countries.
What these data fail to directly portray is the contribution these naval units
made in support of national interests: alliances were strengthened, regions stabilized,
and American world leadership demonstrated.
Given fiscal realities, over 70 of the 426 warships that made up the U.S. Navy
in December 1993 have been or are scheduled to be decommissioned in 1994. If
1993's approximate level of commitments persist in 1994, 54% of the fleet will have
been underway on average, and nearly a quarter of the fleet (over 23%) deployed.
As the numbers of deployable ships decline, keeping ships forward deployed
on station will become increasingly difficult. Considering that operating cycles and
transit times are fairly static, time away from home port (OPTEMPO), deployments
per cycle, and/or deployment lengths will have to increase, to maintain present
commitments. If history is any indication, increasing the OPTEMPO will likely incur
serious problems with personnel, morale, and retention. 10
To meet present requirements with fewer resources, the Navy has scaled
down the number of escorts in the carrier battle groups (CVBG) to an average of two
cruisers (CG) and one destroyer, and does not routinely escort replenishment ships
(except those deployed with the CVBG) or amphibious readiness groups (ARG).
Should these high value ships require escorts in the future, not to mention the Afloat
1 George, J. L. (editor), The U.S. Navy, The view from the Mid-1980's , p.2,
published with the Center for Naval Analyses, Westview Special Studies, 1985. For
example, during the drawdown in 1979-1980, the navy experienced it's worst
retention and recruiting, manning the fleet up to only 91%, and by 1981, "13% of
our ships and 25% of our aircraft squadrons were reporting themselves not combat
ready as a result of personnel shortages."
Pre-Positioned Ships (APF) and various maritime lift components, it becomes
apparent that the idea of a "residual" fleet, one of sufficient back-up surge capability,
does not leave much room for contingencies. This does not even consider the
occasional "uncharted pinnacle" or an unforeseen engineering casualty.
Beyond the mere reduction of the ARG / CVBG escorts, various cost savings
measures were needed in 1993 to help finance the missions in Somalia and in the
Adriatic. Several of these measures, if not positively changed, risk eventually
impacting upon fleet readiness. Examples include the delay of numerous ship and
aircraft overhauls, and the curtailing of 1993 4th quarter Pacific fleet operations and
exercises.
So-called "adaptive force packages" are being considered as a way of solving
the problem. 11 Whereas in the past, the Navy relied mostly on CVBGs or ARGs for
forward presence, it now resorts increasingly to non-carrier combinations of ships.
Some area theater coverage is also increasingly being "gapped."
C. SHIP MIX MISMATCH?
Despite all of this creative re-packaging, the policy of building only the best
warships may simply mean building too few for success in war or availability in
peace. One consequence of this is that the number of ships available to escort and
protect high value ships, which is arguably a requisite for successful prosecution of
the campaign ashore, is noticeably lacking.
"Bergeson, S.A., Adaptive Toint Force Packaging (A1FP) a Critical Analysis,
Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 1993.
It appears that by 2010, the cruiser-destroyer inventory of "presence"
combatants will be comprised exclusively of CG-47, DDG-51, and possibly DD-963
class ships. These vessels, the oldest of which will be over thirty years, will continue,
in all likelihood, to be the most capable warships for protecting high value units, as
well as the escort of shipping. These ships will also be part of the package sent in to
"clean up" the battlespace, when the need arises to sanitize the area of responsibility
(AOR).
As one considers the domestic and international economic climate, makeup
and motivation of international navies, and the Navy's increasing focus on the
littoral regions of the world, it seems that expensive and prestigious ships may be
inappropriate for at least some forms of forward presence. Smaller, yet quite capable,
ships can provide a complementary and increasingly necessary contribution to
presence operations.
These factors affect the conduct of forward operations. The CINCs must
ensure not only the availability oi escorts to protect the CVBGs, ARGs, and the
large vulnerable sealift, but they also require ample forces that can close within range
to affect operations ashore. This requires warships that can sweep the path clear of
threatening mines, submarines, and / or surface combatants, for operations close to
the shore. Conceivably, these last "few miles" will be the toughest part of future
naval warfare.
Whether "showing the flag" or protecting high value ships, forward presence
requires adequate numbers of ships able to perform when, where, and how the
10
circumstances dictate. All of this suggests that the Nation either reassesses and
downscales its commitments to the means available, or it risks the negative tactical
and strategic consequences of overextension.
Corvette flotillas should be considered as a complementary means to meet the
roles and missions entailed by forward presence.
11
II. CORVETTE DESCRIPTION AND EMPLOYMENT
A country can, or will, pay only so much for its war fleet. That amount of money
means so much aggregate tonnage. How shall that tonnage be allotted? And
especially, how shall the total tonnage invested in armored ships be divided? Will
you have a very few big ships, or more numerous medium ships? 12
How can a 280-foot corvette with a notional displacement of 1,500 tons help
solve a future United States forward presence "gap?" In order to provide the reader
with an appreciation of how and what missions corvettes may be expected to
accomplish, this section highlights the capabilities and limitations of these platforms.
By applying new and emerging sensing, data control, and weapon technologies,
corvette flotillas can offer an effective solution for many of the challenges anticipated
in the first part of the twenty-first century.
A. MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES
Operating forward on a long tether places tremendous stress on both the ship
and the crew. Based on interests and goals to be espoused in Chapter IV, the
following general corvette capabilities are envisioned to conduct or support forward
presence missions or tasks:
FIXED, ALWAYS AVAILABLE
Anti-air (AAW) Point defense only
Anti-surface (ASUW) Short range gun / missiles
Anti-submarine (ASW) Shallow water, short range prosecute and attack
OPTIONAL
Strike (STW) Deep strike against shore or surface naval
Mines Minelaying
12Mahan, AT., The Lessons of the War With Spain, p.37, Little Brown, 1911.
12
The corvette flotilla is intended to perform or support the following missions
and tasks: (1) local ASW and ASUW for an approaching force from the sea; (2)
escort high value targets (HVTs) near the terminal points of ingress and egress; (3)
provide ASW and ASUW support for choke point operations; (4) perform airborne
or limited TLAM strike operations; (5) provide a landing and takeoff platform for
various small to medium sized joint air assets; (6) maritime embargo, blockade,
quarantine, interdiction; (7) multi-national maritime cooperation; and (8), perform a
host of non-traditional missions. Chapter V amplifies on each of these areas.
As a point of departure, TABLE 2 portrays a comparison of typical combat
system capabilities presently onboard small combatants. The data are a "composite"
of a number of existing corvette-type ships. n
TABLES 3 and 4 then synthesize these average capabilities of today with
emerging or anticipated technologies of tomorrow, in order to highlight the principal
characteristics of the postulated corvette. It must be noted that the capabilities
envisioned for this 1,500 ton corvette are unsupported by any present engineering or
design studies. 14
nData is a composite from the Ninety-sixth edition of Jane's Fighting Ships, Jane's
Information Group INC., edited by Sharpe, R., Capt, RN, 1993, provided by Larrie
Ferreiro, Navy International Programs Office (IPO) - 03A.
14
It is necessary to determine if the capabilities as envisioned are overly
optimistic, and if so by how much. 15 to 20 percent difference between desired and
technically feasible might be acceptable, whereas 50 percent could prove too much.
13
TABLE 2 - TYPICAL 1500, 2500, AND 3500 LIGHT TONS (LT) CAPABILITIES
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None None VLS Seasparrow
(extended range)
Surface - surface 8xSSM 8xSSM 8xSSM
ASW weapons lx ASW Mortar
2x Torpedoes
2 x Torpedoes 2 x Torpedoes
Guns lx 76 mm 1 x 100 mm 1 x 127 mm






Helicopters 1 x small helo 1 x small helo 1 x medium helo
* Sa'ar 5 has stealth features,
** or the equivalent short range missile (ie: NSSM, Barak, Crotale)
*** this is an average, for example Singapore' corvettes of 500 tons have VDS
14
TABLE 3 - GENERAL CORVETTE PROPOSED CHARACTERISTICS








Operational availability 80 %
TABLE 4 - DESIRED CORVETTE COMBAT CAPABILITIES
Stealth Low RCS, exhaust dispersion, LPI onboard sensors,
primary detect, track, engage from external sources,
prairie - masker anti-submarine protection.
Combat systems Fixed: (4) Harpoon SSMs, (2) 20 mm gatling guns, bow
mounted 76 mm gun with 400 rounds (1) CIWS,
(2) SRBOC launchers with TORCH/ Nulka decoy canisters,
(32) vertical launched RAM anti air (AAW) missiles,
(1) shoulder STINGER, Variable Depth Sonar (VDS),
(6) ASW torpedoes,
Optional: (4) topside angled Tomahawk launchers
( 2 port, 2 starboard), mines and/or depth charges
Chemical / biological Citadel concept in designated areas
Aviation Landing pad (up to SH-60s), UAV refueling Sea state
Sea state (SS) mobile - SS 5, combat capability degrades above SS 4
Even a cursory comparison oi these three tables points out several glaring
differences between what presently exists and the postulated 1,500 ton craft. Perhaps
the six most glaring and suspect are: (1) most small ships in the 1,500 ton range are
not intended to operate far from the shore for extended periods of time; (2) the
additional topside weight and volume caused by the addition of four TLAMs,
presenting implications for ship size and RCS; (3) the desire for a medium vice
small helo launch and recovery capability; (4) the absence of a bow mounted sonar,
with reliance on VDS instead; (5) the primary reliance on external sources of
15
radiated energy for detect / track / engage capability; and (6), crew size is one-half
to one-third that of crew complements on similarly sized ships today.
It is postulated that for presence purposes, six to ten corvettes, aircraft, and a
mother (tender) ship will comprise a flotilla. This number is predicated on the
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h
n = on station requirements




N = % platformsnotavailable
For the purposes of this example, four corvettes are to maintain station for
three, four, or five, days, at various distances from the mother ship (200 nm, 100 nm,
50 nm), using a 15 knot speed of advance (SOA) to station. Only trained crews are
'"Santa Fe Corporation, "A Conceptual and Analytical Study of the Utility of
Speed in Naval Operations," p. A-2, vol II, July 1976, prepared for Director, Systems
Analysis Division (OP-96) Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the
Navy. Formula is a generalized BLF equation, useful to compute the number of
platforms required to maintain a minimal number on station.
16
deployed, so the training coefficient is negligible, and the percentage of platforms
available is computed using an 80 percent operational availability (percentage of
time the ship is mission capable). 80 percent is used for the overhaul coefficient b*,
whose reciprocal (1/b) is the fraction of platforms out-of-overhaul. ,b The percentage
of platforms not available is computed at 20%.
Based on these assumptions, the impact of transit distances (nautical miles)
and the number of platforms required on station can be used to determine the
number of corvettes required in the flotilla. TABLE 5 reflects the results:
lb
IBID, p. A-l. The corvettes are allocated three to four weeks of time off station
in a dedicated availability every 6 months, and a one week dry docking contingent
on the location, approximately every 3 years.
17
TABLE 5: RESULTS OF BLF FOR REQUIRED NUMBER OF CORVETTES
Ships on station (n) Distance to station Time on station /
Mission time
Ships required (N)
4 200 nm 3 days /
4 days + 3 hours
9
4 200 4 days /
5 days + 3 hours
8
4 200 5 days /
6 days + 3 hours
8
4 100 nm 3 days /
3 days + 14 hours
8
4 100 4 days /
4 davs + 14 hours
7
4 100 5 days /
5 days + 13 hours
7
4 50 nm 3 days /
3 days + 7 hours
7
4 50 4 days /
4 days + 7 hours
7
4 50 5 days /
5 days + 7 hours
7
It is essential to keep the crew size small, and the corvette is envisioned to be
manned by a crew of not more than 40 - 50 personnel. 17 This complement allows for
three-five days on station. At the end of the patrol, the corvette transits back to the
mothership, whose location is dependent on the nature of the local threat capability.
Note that the total mission time is less then seven days.
17The Israeli SA'AR 5 with a displacement of 1200 tons operates with a crew of 64
to 74, depending on the air complement. The postulated corvette is envisioned to
incorporate more automated capability than the present SA'AR 5, thereby bringing
down the manning level.
The flotilla's entire infrastructure is envisioned to remain afloat, the mothership
anchoring offshore, mooring at a nearby host nation, or under extreme and adverse
conditions, supporting the corvettes by transfer and replenishment at sea. The afloat
nature permits as much independence as possible of any potential host nation
complications, intending to facilitate the insertion of the corvettes, and when the time
comes, packing them up and departing the area.
Because of the high tempo of operations under these conditions, a
replacement "Blue / Gold" crew takes over at the end of six months. This scheme
offers a complimentary alternative for the CINC to meet his presence requirements,
as it mitigates the decreasing pool of ships and long transit times to AORs,
providing greater ship utilization.
One factor not to be overlooked is the difficulty of maintaining crew
proficiency in the various mission areas. To overcome this, the Blue / Gold "off
crew" when free from normal operational responsibilities, would devote their duty
time and effort to training and multi-mission proficiency.
The mother ship bases scout aircraft (year 2010 equivalents of SH-60F, HH-60
helicopters"") and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance and targeting.
Each corvette provides a mobile flight pad capable of carrying, landing, or launching
these aircraft, as well as minimal refueling capability only for the UAVs. The landing
pad could also prove attractive in operations with various joint force packages.
18 SH-60s with fire and forget ASUW missiles and possibly airborne low
frequency (LF) dipping sonar (ALFS), HH-60 Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).
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B. ENDURANCE
In the age of sail, time at sea was mostly a matter of the prevailing winds, sea
conditions, and the supply of onboard stores, especially water. It was not unusual
for a ship to remain at sea for months before the need to replenish potable water and
foodstuffs required the ship to make landfall. With the advent of steam propulsion
came unprecedented tactical mobility for naval craft, yet also restricted strategic
mobility. The inefficient steam engines of the early warships meant a new need for
numerous coaling stations abroad. For this reason new ships continued to be rigged
for "auxiliary" sail for some years. The development of more efficient propulsion
plants negated the necessity for sailing power, yet even today, every ship forward
deployed still depends on reliable replenishment in-port or at sea .
The propulsion system for the proposed corvette will be a hybrid diesel and
gas turbine configuration (CODOG) , allowing greater endurance at low to moderate
speeds, while providing the capability for high speed sprints when required. The U.S.
Navy has had CODOG experience from the early 1970s thanks to the 165 foot, 260
ton PG 84 Class Patrol Gunboat.
Maximum range is estimated to be 3,800 nm at a cruising speed of 15 kts.
Since many missions in littoral waters are likely to require long periods of slow speed
(5-10 knots), the ship could operate on station, without refueling, for up to 25 days,
using its diesels. The corvette should be capable of taking on fuel or stores from any
naval ship, as well as from those of most NATO allies.
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But endurance is measured by much more than merely gallons per mile
steamed. Perhaps more importantly, the crew (stores, rest) and maintenance (spare
parts, repair time) requirements dictate just how long a naval force can maintain
station. Crew endurance will be the governing factor under arduous tasks such as
blockading, boarding, and inspecting. Lastly, because of the inherently smaller
ordinance loadouts, replenishment in time of hostilities would possibly be more
frequent. Each of these areas are further addressed in Chapter III.
The mothership must be designed with two thoughts in mind. First, although
it is intended to remain outside the area(s) of contention, the ship must have self
protection and staying power. Second, the mother ship must be able to furnish
almost all of the corvette's sustainment needs, as the corvettes have a negligible self-
maintenance capability. From topping off reefers, to conducting engine or combat
system module change-outs, the mothership will be designed to reduce reliance on
host nations and/or other fleet assets. Typical ship characteristics of the mothership
might be: 20,000 ton displacement, length 650 feet, and a range of 6,000 nm at 23
knots. 14 For the purpose of the thesis, unit acquisition cost is postulated to be $700
million.
The mothership concept poses obvious vulnerabilities. As mentioned earlier, it
will typically remain out of harm's way, since a loss could entail the "catastrophic
degradation" of the flotilla's combat capabilities as a whole. The thesis only makes
19
Meyer, V.A., and Hopkins, W.J., Naval Surface Warfare Center (NAVSWC),
"Conceptual Ship Characteristics and Capabilities," [date unknown], p.III-8, a sample
mothership design (LX(M)).
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reference to the issue; further research will need to throw light on the liabilities
that may be incurred by "over-dependence" on motherships. 20
C. STEALTH
The likely impact of stealth technology in the twenty-first century is not yet
fully appreciated. Its application for surface ships is multidimensional, and each
dimension must be considered. All spectrums must be masked, including noise,
infrared (IR) signature, radar cross section (RCS), and wake. As success is met in one
area, potential opponents are likely to concentrate on exploiting different
weaknesses. Operating in the littoral, will place a premium on stealth characteristics.
Various applications are being evaluated to minimize vessel detectability. The
proposed corvette has a small radar cross section (RCS), while presenting minimal
freeboard, sloped surfaces, and radar absorbent materials (RAM). The corvette's
electronics will normally operate in a passive mode, as Space Electronic Warfare
(SEW) assets, scout aircraft, and Aegis DDGs/CGs will provide it with primary
detection, threat warning, and weapon cuing inputs. The corvette's combat system
integrates this external information with onboard sensors, such as infrared search
and track (IRST).
20
Uhlig, F., Vietnam: The Naval Story, p.324, Naval Institute Press, 1986. For
example, during the Vietnam War, motherships often had difficulty finding suitable
anchorages, that were deep enough. Also useful would be to examine the U-boats'
dependence on the "Milk Cows" (U-tankers).
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D. SURVIVABILITY
Presence can be a demanding business when contested. Future threats to any
ship operating close to hostile shore will potentially be intense, multidirectional, and
not necessarily of a naval origin. Corvettes will usually not survive a direct missile
hit, but then neither will larger combatants, as evidenced during the Falklands
Conflict.
The question is often asked how these ships will perform in a high threat
environment. Corvettes, or any ship for that matter, are not immune to the dangers
of operating in restricted waters. But the flotilla synthesizes and exploits existing
and anticipated technologies: the ships combine adaptable combat system modules,
stealth applications, low probability of intercept (LPI) sensors, CITADEL positive air
pressurized spaces, and external tracking and weapon cuing systems into one
combat package. Most important, it is to be remembered that the value of the
concept is to be measured by the synergistic effectiveness of the flotilla as a whole.
Corvettes are designed to be small, with small crews, so that in a scenario with a
high probability of loss, they can be sent to perform the dangerous missions.
In conclusion, an extraordinary 35 percent of this ship's 1,500 tons will be
dedicated to pure warfighting capability, because less weight and space need be
devoted to range, endurance, and habitability. With a long-range detection,
tracking, and engagement capability, the naval corvette can be a force multiplier,
augmenting the CINCs concentration of forces in both space and time. The bottom
line repeats an old maxim: battle in the littoral will be most often be won by the side
23
which scouts the best, and is the first to fire effectively. 21 The corvette flotilla fits that
bill.
21Hughes, W.P., Jr., Capt USN (Ret), Fleet Tactics, p. XV, Naval Institute Press,
1986. Naval Institute Press.
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III. SMALL SHIPS - TRUTH AND MYTH
Superiority in courage and skill combined can wrest victory form great odds, and no
amount ot skill will atone for the lack of daring, of unflinching resolution, and of dogged
capacity to stand punishment; but where courage is equal, skill will always win; and
where courage and skill are both equal, then the side which has the best ships and guns
will overwhelm the other, no matter what may be the flags under which the combatants
fight.
22
Throughout the twentieth century, the United States has earned a reputation
for sailing the high seas with warships of the highest capabilities. These ships have
come in various sizes, shapes, and configurations. However, what stands out in the
minds of most, are the large, powerful, and expensive descendants oi eighteenth
century ships o( the line, namely battleships, aircraft carriers, and today's Aegis
warships. These prestigious capital ships combine the highest qualities and ratios of
speed, firepower, and endurance.
Since no nation possess unlimited resources, determining the correct number,
capability, and mix of surface warships, has always proved elusive. The dilemma
often centers around the question of quality vs. quantity, specifically how to build,
maintain, and operate extremely capable and expensive ships, adequate in number to
persevere during conflict, while also having enough ships to accomplish a myriad of
peacetime commitments.
This should come as no surprise, considering that on one hand the decision
maker must prioritize among shifting geopolitical, fiscal, domestic, and technological
trends, while on the other hand he must strive to reassess the relative value of
22Roosevelt, T., The Naval Operations of the War Between Great Britain and the
United States, p. 97, Sampson Low, Marston & Co., LTD
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particular warship qualities. No virtues can be considered sacrosanct, a few
examples being: costs in time, dollars, and manpower; displacement / volume;
stealth / detectability; firepower, staying power, defensive power, endurance, and
habitability. In choosing forces to perform forward presence missions in the future,
the criticality of making the "right choices" can not be overemphasized.
The solution in the past has been to complement the "core" fleet of big ships
with sloops, frigates, and destroyers. These smaller, less capable commerce raiders
and/or protectors, were "to be used primarily, but not exclusively, to protect and
assist the capital ships in carrying out their appointed mission of opening up the way
for devastating attacks on the seaboard and merchant shipping of the enemy
country."2
"
1 Times and circumstances have changed, but naval warfare still requires
fleets with a balanced mix.
Could smaller warships, produced and dispersed in greater numbers, be
effective simply because there are more of them? The question has been asked
throughout naval history?
A. PAX-BRITANNICA
After the Napoleonic wars, Britain embarked upon a period of relative
stability, known as the Pax Britannica. During this time, Britain was able to maintain
a balance of power throughout Europe by wielding influence through a combination
2
'Sprout, H. & M, The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918. p.287.
Command of the sea through Battle fleet supremacy.
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of international commerce, finance, diplomacy, and sea power. This era is of interest
as several dilemmas facing decision makers then are apropos today.
The Royal Navy entered the era with nearly an 800-ship battle tested navy,
having defeated in succession, the Spaniards, Dutch, and the French. Of this battle
fleet, several hundred vessels were classified as capital ships, with no comparable
challenge on the high seas. Without a direct threat, and because of constant fiscal
pressures, the fleet was progressively reduced in size.
During this era the British Admiralty did not guard the Empire's global sea
communication by scattering its men-of-war around the world by ones and twos.
With superiority in capital ships, the British had little to fear from enemy fleets, and
was free to convoy their merchantmen with moderate frigate and corvette forces, as
the cruisers, aided by privateers, blockaded enemy ports, patrolled the sea lanes, and
either destroyed or drove them from the seas. To maintain British influence abroad,
squadrons of smaller ships were maintained in four major geographical "hubs:" the
West Indies, Cape Horn, Eastern Asia - Australia, and the Mediterranean. These
squadrons earned their keep, as scarcely a year went by when they were not engaged
in some active operations, especially the cleaning up of the slave trade and piracy.
During the period of 1816-1856 there were "no great pitched battles with
formidable foes; and although the period is that of Algiers, Navarin, St. Jean d'Acre,
and Sebastopol, it was more a period of small wars with uncivilized peoples, of
27
steady, but nearly noiseless extension of empire, and of the onerous policing of the
m24
ocean.
Although the smaller frigates and gunboats did a superb job policing and
influencing truculent subjects, they did so at the cost of building and manning fewer
ships of the line. The success of the wisdom is debatable, but at least one historian
points out that it possibly weakened the fighting power of the Royal Navy.2? By the
early 1900's, under reforms driven by Admiral Fisher, "nothing was viewed as
preposterous than the maintenance of vast numbers of slow, obsolescent small cruiser
and gunboats all over the globe, wasting money and especially men." Fisher argued
that in time of war, "An enemy cruiser would lap them up like an armadillo let loose
on an ant hill!"2"
The lesson for the future is that despite what ever success a fleet may have
enjoyed abroad, leaders must continually reassess the various warship attributes, and
remember that nothing is sacrosanct. The essence of any warship is its ability to
seize, control, and deny, all else is secondary. Although the British cruisers, sloops,
and gunboats had performed well over the decades, in time circumstances negated
their utility.
24Clowes, Wm. Laird, The Royal Navy, A History, Vol VI, p.vii, Sampson Low,
Marston and Company, 1901.





The present composition and employment of the American fleet bears little
resemblance to anything the nation maintained before the Twentieth Century, yet
several naval constants warrant mention.
There was a lack of enthusiasm in supporting a standing naval force in early
America. After the War of Independence, the small Continental Navy was deemed
"an expendable luxury," and the few remaining vessels were sold off. 27 Even with the
adoption of the new constitution a few years later (1789), Congress chose not to
"provide and maintain a Navy," relegating naval appropriations to the maintenance
of the national debt.
Meanwhile, American merchant shipping expanded in the Mediterranean and
Caribbean Seas. Both places were notorious for piracy, and without a naval force to
protect American interests, the nation had little recourse. In the case of the
Mediterranean, this brought on the paying of tribute to the corsairs oi the Barbary
Coast.
Despite opposition from the Jeffersonian Republicans, Congress decided to put
a halt to the pirate's preying, and passed the Naval Act of 1794. This Act provided
funding for the nation's first warships, three "super 44" and three "36 gun" frigates.
The appropriations were contingent upon the threat from the Barbary pirates; should
a peaceful settlement be reached, construction was to be cancelled. 2" But the
27tTotter, E.B. & Nimitz, C. W., Sea Power, a Naval History, p.187, Prentice Hall,
1960.
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Federalist War Department harbored broader ambitions, and commenced a program
to build not six frigates, but six "top of the battle line cruisers," and three frigates.
However, peace with the pirates was declared in 1796, and perhaps in a twist of fate,
President Washington somehow persuaded Congress to continue construction of the
three frigates.
24 These frigates, launched in 1798, were the finest ships of their class,
yet operating singly, they would quickly prove inadequate for the tasks at sea.
During the Quasi-War with France (1798-1801), the navy was tasked to protect
and escort merchant convoys against the marauding privateers in the Caribbean. A
few frigates were initially sent, but met with only limited success. It quickly became
obvious that smaller ships, in ample quantities, were needed to blockade the various
hostile ports, and conduct operations in the shallow waters. In response, Robert
Stoddert, President Adam's Secretary of the Navy, built up two Caribbean squadrons,
each comprised of one to two frigates, and three or four smaller ships (sloops, brigs,
and schooners). The result was that the American fleet could pursue the small, swift,
and shallow draft privateers, and contribute effectively to bringing the problem to a
conclusion. 30
From 1801 to 1805, the Nation, under President Jefferson, sent a series of naval
squadrons to deal with the Barbary Pirates. The Tripolitan War highlighted the
difficulties oi maintaining a forward presence several thousand miles abroad.
2H
Weigley, R.F., The American Way of War. A History of United States Military
Strategy and Policy, p.42, Indiana Univ. Press, 1973.
24
Potter,p.l89.
,0Uhlig, F., How Navies Fight, p. 13, Naval Institute Press, 1993.
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Despite several victories, the few ships were largely ineffective again, simply because
their number was too small for all of the duties assigned, which included not only
blockading, but the escorting of merchantmen/ 1 The United States eventually
reverted back to the paying of tribute.
One effect from this episode was the re-discovery of the need for several small
ships to work with the larger frigates. Smaller ships were able to operate in the
shallower waters and perform various tasks which the larger ships were ill-suited.
This freed up the larger ships to operate in areas where their influence could be more
appreciated.
During this time, President Jefferson cancelled the few naval construction plans
for larger ships of the line (74s), in favor of a large fleet of tiny coastal defense
gunboats. Costing only a few thousand dollars each, the price appealed to Jefferson's
fiscal concerns; Congress authorized 25 boats in 1805, 50 in 1806, and 188 in 1807.
All but six to eight of these boats were to be laid up until time of war, at which time
over 200 of the gunboats would sortie in defense of the Maine to Louisiana
coastline. 32 These gunboats were strictly defensive, intended only to protect the
American seacoast from invasion. They were never intended for extended operations




32Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, p. 58.
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With tensions building prior to the outbreak oi the War of 1812, Paul
Hamilton, President Madison's Secretary of the Navy, pointed out the short comings
of the gunboats. But his foreboding went unheeded, and with the War of 1812, the
economy fleet floundered against the thick sided British frigates. The fifty footers, by
any measure, proved impotent, as the Royal Navy was successful at not only
blockading the entire eastern coastline of the United States, but was also able to
invade any coastal port. The "raiding, looting, burning, and general disruption of life
along the Delaware River and Chesapeake Bay," demonstrated that against a
formidable naval power, small gun ships are inadequate."
Now consider the brief but significant successes of the 16 other commissioned
vessels, of which seven were frigates, and the rest were corvettes, sloops, and brigs.
Each of these American ships often carried more guns than they rated, and with their
courage and daring, proved superior in force, winning many of the initial battles.
^
Following several devastating engagements, the British forbade their "18-pounder"
frigates from engaging the "24-pounder" American frigates singlehandedly, and
required their ships to cruise in couples or small squadrons when possible. These
restrictions were to increase their odds of overpowering any American antagonists."
Although the American small ships fought heroically for the first nine months






American squadrons on the lakes, and the frigates and sloops on the oceans, and the
ruthless harrying of the British trade by the American commerce-destroyers, inflicted
such severe punishment as to make the British willing to call the fight a draw."36
Following the War of 1812, Congress sold off the gunboats, and authorized
four 74s, six "44 gun" frigates and six sloops. But this turned out to be a passing
moment; come the recession of 1816, the heavier frigates and ships of the line,
which required larger crews and were expensive to maintain, were cancelled. This
time it was considered prudent to employ sloops and schooners, supported by a few
large ships.
37
The War of 1812 pointed out several fallacies that are applicable today. A few
are noted: (1) nothing can compensate for a lack of adequate preparation and training
prior to the outbreak of hostilities; (2) most battles are fought on a "come as you are"
basis; and (3) small "economy fleets" are not a solution for anything; (4) a few
extremely capable ships will not always be adequate to guarantee success in battle.
C MAHANIAN INFLUENCE
Until the late nineteenth century, commerce raiding and coast-defense were
the basis of American naval strategy. Thanks to technological innovation, and Alfred
Thayer Mahan's "Influence ofSeapmuenm 'Mistonj" the idea of a permanent American
fighting fleet came into vogue. Mahan, along with national leaders such as Henry
Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, insisted that the navy was not merely for
-
''Roosevelt, p. 285.
37Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, p. 87.
33
defense, but was to be used as an instrument to promote national interests. They
insisted that a great navy made up of powerful battleships was necessary for the
Nation to reach its potential.
After the Spanish-American War, a U.S. Navy of capital ships grew rapidly,
becoming second only to the Royal Navy in terms of tonnage and numbers of
battleships. The build-up peaked as naval appropriations tapered off during
President Roosevelt's second term, Taft's administration, and President Wilson's first
term. What stands out, is that with what money was appropriated, the nation
neglected to build smaller vessels so as to be able to build a few big ships. Ironically,
most of the responsibilities abroad were being met by smaller cruisers and
destroyers.
D. WORLD WAR I
The small ships that were necessary to protect the allie's ocean-going traffic
were found to be in short supply. As the Germans sought to sever their opponent's
Atlantic and Mediterranean life arteries, it became obvious that many small
combatants, in the form of destroyers, sloops, and gunboats, not more battleships,
were needed.
The Royal Navy imposed a so-called "distant" blockade on the German High
Sea Fleet from the first day of World War I. The blockade was generally effective, but
the Royal Navy and allied shipping were to meet their challenge elsewhere. Within a
few short months of the war, U-boats with torpedoes and mines were operating in all
of the waters surrounding the British Isles, Western France, and in the Mediterranean.
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The critical waterborne flow of allied war materials and resources quickly became
tenuous, as the U-Boats began sinking hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping. 38
When the United States entered the war in 1917, American ship construction,
which for years had been devoted to building capital ships, rapidly shifted to the
production of much needed small submarine hunting destroyers. Supporting the war
in Europe, several shipyards met the task, for example one yard reputedly built
destroyers in as few as 75 days. 34 The main task of the Navy, would prove to be the
unglamorous, yet necessary, protection o( tankers and transports.40 Six American
destroyers sailed for Britain on April 24, 1917 and within three weeks were assisting
with anti-submarine operations. As the patrols shifted their efforts from solely
hunting the submarines to the escorting of convoys, over one-half of the entire
American destroyer force became involved (34 of 68). 41
Although limited in capability, these ships were always in short demand, as
their duties were divided between supporting fleet operations and protecting convoys
in the Atlantic, North Sea, Strait of Dover, and Mediterranean.42 In time, the protected
convoys overcame the U-boats.
IHtKWithin three months of declaring unrestricted submarine warfare, the U-boats
sank 470 allied ocean going ships and over 500 coastal freighters.
'"Weigley, p. 194.
40
Uhlig, How Navies Fight, p. 100.
4, IBID, p. 93.
42IBID.p.86.
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E. HI/LOW DEBATES OF THE 1970s
Although the Navy had been the principal foreign policy tool for years, a recurring
theme during the 1950s, 1960s, and the 1970s was "we will have to do more with
less." Than as operations off of Vietnam began to take their toll, money was often
diverted from shipbuilding, maintenance, and modernization to fund ongoing fleet
operations... annual official Navy posture statements warned of adverse trends, but
an illusion of overall superiority was officially maintained. 43
In the early 1970s, then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Zumwalt
struggled to find the correct mix, size, and direction for the U.S. Navy to meet its
global commitments. He became concerned that the insistence on only the highest
quality and most expensive weapon systems, would lead to insufficient fleet
numbers. His "solution" was to advocate a "Hi/Lo Mix" force structure, which
emphasized the potential of (relatively) low cost and less capable ships. These
moderate performance ships would allow the fleet to have enough ships to be "in
places at the same time to get the job done." 44
Zumwalt's high-end ships were to have operated up front in so-called high-
threat areas, while the low-end ships would guard the "low threat" transatlantic sea
lanes of communication (SLOCs).
Despite Admiral Zumwalt's Hi/Lo concept, Congress voted for a large ship
navy. Smaller, less capable vessels were seen as desirable, but since they were
assigned lower priorities, they were generally cut from the budget (FFG-7 class is one
4?Lehman, J. Jr., Command of the Seas, pp. 95 & 117, Charles Scribner's Sons,
1988. Quote by Admiral Zumwalt.
^Ryan, P ..First Line of Defense, The U.S. Navy Since 1945, p.75, Hoover
Institution Press, Stanford University, 1981.
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notable exception). The Hi requests were either met or even increased. Many follow
on CNOs, such as Admiral Hayward discounted the Hi/Lo concept, viewing the lo
end being set too low, and reintroduced the philosophy of building maximum
capability into ships. Hayward believed there was no room for compromise, as
marginal, cost-effective ships, "were predisposed to end up as seagoing coffins."45
The U.S. Navy depended on a favorable combat advantage, as any war of attrition
was doomed to fail.
The corvette proposed in this thesis is not to be confused with Zumwalt's
Hi/Lo concept. This postulated corvette is intended to steam in front, leading the
fight in littoral waters. The lo is not set too low, and although the ships cannot do
everything that a larger more capable combatant can, the flotilla offers a synergistic
and complementary addition to any battle force.
F. FAST ATTACK CRAFT (FAC) vs CORVETTES
FACs and corvettes are the surface warship of choice for many navies of the
world, as they offer the advantage of good striking power at economical cost. Both
types oi vessels have shortcomings, but what distinguishes the corvette from the FAC
is the corvette's better seakeeping performance, longer endurance, and operational
versatility. For example, corvettes are not confined to coastal operations, and do not
"necessarily sacrifice AAW and ASW capability merely to mount an ASUW
4TBID, p.173.
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function."46 For these reasons, FACs came to be seen as inadequate in meeting the
needs of many nations that had purchased them.
By the mid - 1970s, the dominance of the 160 - ton FACs began to give way to
the near 400-ton fast patrol boats, and by the 1980s, an increasing number of navies
began acquiring corvette-sized (500-1,000 ton) ships. 47 This is attributable to the fact
that FACs are generally single-role vessels, dedicated to the anti-surface warfare
(ASUW), to the neglect of other missions such as ASW, escort, or patrol duties.
FAC mission effectiveness during the 1967 and 1973 Middle East Wars has
been amply documented, but since 1980, small craft have not fared well as evidenced
by the quick destruction of Libyan (March 1986 - Gulf of Sidra), Iranian (October
1987, April 1988), and Iraqi (Desert Storm - January 1991) small boats. Their loss
revealed that the smaller FACs are highly vulnerable due to a lack of state of the art
point defense weapons, sensors, or decoys.4h
Incorporating sophisticated tactical data systems (TDS), enhanced weapon
suites, and electronic data link capabilities, corvettes overcome many of these
shortcomings. Most corvettes are able to perform in at least two of three primary
mission areas (ASW, ASUW, and/or AAW), with fire control systems and typical
weapon loadouts containing surface to surface missiles (SSM), 76 mm gun, point
4(Todd, D., Lindberg, M., "The Trend Towards Replacement of FACS With
Corvettes," p. 284, Navy International, September / October 1993.
47Todd, p.286.
4HBrower, K., Kehoe, J.W., Captain, USN, (Ret), Naval Engineers Toumal. p.131,
July 1993. authors replying to comments made by Cdr P.E. Sullivan, USN.
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defense surface to air (SAM) or close in weapon system (CIWS), and ASW
torpedoes.44
The new coastal patrol boat (PBC) is not to be confused with a corvette or
even a FAC. The PC varies significantly from the combat "sea denial" characteristics
of a FAC, although these two ships are similar in overall dimensions. The PC's
austere combat suite is not commensurate with its primary mission of coastal patrol
and interdiction, though it fits the secondary mission of covert special warfare
operations. The PC lacks punch, as its mission envisions larger combatant fire
support and existing control of the seas/"
G. ADVANTAGE IN NUMBERS
As important as the per unit cost is the advantage associated with the numbers
of combatants. Since the flotilla normally operates electronically passive (EMCON A)
and is dispersed, an adversary faces an uncertain number of "silent" platforms, all oi
which he must attempt to detect, track, and engage. When having more "blips" to
account for in a larger target area, a potential adversary must either disperse his fire,
or concentrate it on a few ships, leaving others disengaged. This dispersion spreads
the risk for the corvette force.
4l
Todd, p.288.
^'McCartney, F.N., Program Engineer, Patrol Coastal Program, Naval Sea Systems
Command, p. 128, Naval Engineers Tournal, July 1993. Commenting on an article by
Brower, K., Kehoe, J.W., Captain, USN, (Ret.), "Fast Attack Craft - A Comparative
Analysis."
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Wayne Hughes, Jr. has presented a "Fractional Exchange Ratio" (FER) as a
method to compare warship attributes in today's uncertain environment. FER
assumes that the circumstances under which a warship will fight, including the
attributes of the adversary, are unknown. The FER approach pits alternative
candidate designs against each other, for which the design attributes are known
instead oi speculated on the attributes and numbers of units of a hypothesized
enemy. The key attributes that bear heavily on modern naval combat are as follows:
Striking power (the number of accurate (good) shots launched)
Staying power (ability of ship to absorb hits and remain fighting)
Counterfire (defensive firepower),
Scouting effectiveness (detection and targeting)
Softkill counteractions
Defensive readiness
Training, organization, doctrine, and motivation 5 -
Hughes points out that the attribute which is consistently the most
advantageous in force-on-force engagements is the number of combat units: "For
example, if forces engaged on side A are twice as numerous as side B, then for
combat parity, each unit of side B must have twice the striking power, twice the
staying power, and twice the defensive firepower of each of side A's combat units.
This combat advantage of numbers seems to apply under a very wide set oi
circumstances.'02
"Hughes, W.P. Jr., "The Value of Warship Attributes in Missile Combat," p.39,




Hughes also points out that because of an "expanding cumulative advantage,"
the "rate of casualties imposed is proportionate to the number of forces remaining,
with the ratio continuously increasing in favor of the stronger [more numerous]
initial force."5 ' In an engagement in which all enemy units are known and within
range, the commander is better off with twice as many units of force than with units
of twice the rate of effective " firepower."
In addition, eight contacts are harder to detect and track, much less to engage,
than of only one or two. Due to the lethality potential of the eight ships in the
flotilla, the adversary can ill afford to neglect any, since each unit has the firepower
to engage four of the enemy. All combined, the corvette flotilla has the the capability
to damage more than their apparent weight would suggest. Just as ship of the line
tactics called to concentrate firepower through the use of columnar formations, the
flotilla's effectiveness depends on the combined effect of force.
H. SMALL DOES NOT EQUAL CHEAP but DOES EQUATE TO MANY
There are opportunity cost involved by building corvettes, such as the
diverting of funds from other projects and unknown implications for coercive
diplomacy (see Chapter V). But quite a few capable corvettes can be mass produced
fairly quickly at a relatively inexpensive price. Taking advantage of the various
technologies available, the corvette flotilla warrant consideration with the increasing
emphasis on fighting in the littorals. Bowing to fiscal demands, the $200 million a
"Hughes, W.P., Jr., Capt USN (Ret), Fleet Tactics , p.36, Naval Institute Press,
1986.
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copy could be further reduced by using the prototype to replace the aging Coast
Guard cutter fleet, and a less capable version could be competitive in the export
market.
Let us examine in rough terms the cost of an eight corvette flotilla with a
mothership: An equal cost bundle comparison between (3) DDG-51 Arleigh Burke
class
destroyers and (8) corvette type ships with a mothership can be demonstrated as
follows. Acquisition costs for the flotilla is
mothership - ($700 million / ship ) x (1 ship) = $ 700 million
corvette - ($200 million / ship) x (8 ships) = $1.600 million
flotilla acquisition costs = $2.3 billion
Considering $800 million for a DDG, an equal cost bundle roughly equates to three
DDG's, offering a combatant ratio of eight corvettes to three DDGs. The relevance of
this difference in numbers is apparent when considering that oi the eight corvettes,
an average of six are typically maintained on station (eight times 80 percent
availability), forward deployed. Of the three DDGs, one is on station forward
deployed, while the other two are in various stages oi training, transit, or
maintenance. The corvettes involve tradeoffs, such as shorter time on station, less
staying power, and the need for a mothership, but there are six separate capable
ships, either in six physically different areas or operating cooperatively together.
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Similarly comparing the personnel side of operational costs:
mothership - 600 personnel per ship [ 225 operational + 375 repair personnel ]M
corvettes - 50 personnel per ship (times eight ships) (times 2 crews) = 800
flotilla subtotal = 1400
DDG-51 - 360 personnel per ship (times 3 ships) = 1,080
Although these hypothetical numbers do not count the flotilla's CONUS based repair
or squadron personnel, the (3) DDG-51 s require over 300 less personnel than the
flotilla. The tradeoff from the additional personnel cost again comes from the
benefits of having six operational combatants vice only one ship forward deployed.
An example of a tactical benefit was displayed in a thesis on shallow water
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) by Martirano.^ The thesis starts out hypothesizing
that shallow water ASW involves short detection ranges, which requires direct
screens made up of many active sensors. Using data from Ship ASW Readiness and
Effectiveness Measurements (SHAREMS), Martirano calculated shallow water ASW
measures of effectiveness (MOE) for hi and low frequency sonars. His results
indicated that active sonar requires mutual support, and at an equal cost, small
corvette flotillas could actively search a larger area than a DDG-51. Additionally, it is
^Repair personnel rotate with shore intermediate maintenance activities (SIMAs)
among three groups, 1 year ashore, 6 months deployed; operational crewmembers
deploy for 6 months before being relieved by the CONUS based squadron, rotation
working out to be 6 months deployed, 6 months CONUS, supporting the deployed
flotilla.
^Martirano, J. P. Jr, Shallow Water ASW, A Two Stage Concept, p. 51, Masters
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA, September 1991. The thesis looked
at 1,000 ton, five corvette flotillas with SQS-53 sonars.
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pointed out that the dispersed units are able to free up the multi-mission blue water
hulls for other missions.
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IV. NATIONAL INTERESTS
Although the term "national interest" rolls easily off the tongue, it is not a
concept that leads to easy understanding or wisdom. This is understandable,
considering that the process of projecting national interests is necessarily complex, as
it must consider a diversity of interweaving factors, including uncertain shifts in the
international order, newly defined geopolitical relations, and new domestic priorities.
Nonetheless, an articulated vision of a nation's interests is critical, since it drives the
formulation of the national strategy and the structure and role of military forces.
This chapter makes one major assumption - that maintaining a robust American
military, capable of responding when and where the nation deems necessary, is in
the national interest.
Forward presence is one mission which has been declared of strategic
importance in supporting and reenforcing our interests abroad as well as horne.^
Since the United States is a maritime nation that is dependent on overseas trade and
raw materials, the Navy is expected to contribute actively in national growth and
prosperity.
A. GOALS
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity....
^U.S. Department of Defense, Aspin, L., Secretary of Defense, The Bottom-Up
Review: Forces For a New Era, p. 7, September 1,1993.
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It seems that all national goals should emanate, either directly or indirectly,
from the ideals espoused in the Preamble of the Constitution. The National Security
Strategy reenforces this, as it iterates that "The United States must ensure its security
as a free and independent nation, and the protection of its fundamental values,
institutions, and people/7 Unfortunately, it is becoming harder to differentiate just
who is "we" in "we the people." Some people fear that the country is fragmenting
into a wide diversity of "ism's," each made up of various social classes, ages, and life
styles, with no obvious national consensus. This is critical, as domestic and foreign
policy concerns are inseparable. Given today's influences, the Nation probably would
not fully embrace President Kennedy's inaugural address "we shall pay any price,
bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe."
Nevertheless, retreat and isolation remain non-options.
The following three goals are envisioned: (1) enhance domestic economic
competitiveness, (2) contribute to the emergence of a stable international order,
(3) support the United Nations.
The first goal is an example of the domestic - foreign policy inseparability, as
it acknowledges that the Nation's wealth, power, and prestige depend on the
strength of its economy. The U.S. economy is about twice the size of that of the
nearest competitor (Japan), with a GNP of nearly $4 trillion a year and. Yet, the
United States is also the world's largest debtor, with a $4.5 trillion dollar debt. This
issue has yet to be fully addressed.
^National Security Strategy, p.3.
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America's economic dominance in the immediate post-World War II era has
evidently run its course; patterns of economic growth, global trade, money markets,
percentages of gross world product (GWP), and capital flow™ have shifted. For
example, the total volume of world trade has more than doubled since 1980. Trade
across the Pacific has exceeded that across the Atlantic for the last five years, and a
RAND analysis predicts that the combined national products of the several East
Asian Countries (Japan, China, South Korea, and Taiwan) will exceed the GNP of
the United States by the year 201 W
The increased economic strength of U.S. trading partners, notably Japan,
China, and Germany, is expected to influence future security relationships also.
Japan is unquestionably an economic superpower. It is now the world's biggest
creditor, and is a large contributor of international aid. 60 China has the world's third
largest economy, and could conceivably be number one by 2010.
Global resource distribution is expected to intensify in the Twenty-first
century. Just as in the past, areas will be considered strategically significant if they
control access to markets and raw materials. The amounts of cultivatable soil,
forests, minerals, and water are finite; access will influence international growth and
"K
Laurance, Edward J., The International Arms Trade, p. 127, Lexington Books,
1992. a 1991 study by Morgan Stanley and Company said "the total demand for
capital by Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East would exceed the
Western worlds supply by more than $200 billion a year in the next few years."
^Wolf, C, Long Term Economic and Military Trends, p.vi, RAND 1950-2010; N-
2757-USDP, April 1989.
''"Japan's overseas assistance is based on financial assistance, direct military
assistance and cooperation is prohibited, for now.
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development. The United State's is heavily dependent-on imported raw materials,
and any disruption with the transport could have enormous economic and security
implications. 61
The biggest example is that the United States will remain dependant on
foreign oil as domestic production declines and import percentages (approximately
40% Mid 1994) increase. What could change the strategic landscape here, is that
Russia and Central Asia are entering the market, which in the future could decrease
the West's reliance on Persian Gulf oil.
The second goal is "to develop some concepts which will enable us to
contribute to the emergence of a stable order.'"12 For the United States, global
stability does not equate necessarily with maintaining the status quo, but rather the
preservation of an environment in which U.S. interests are secure. Stability can not
imply the complete absence of violence, revolution, or aggression, nor does it imply
supporting every existing government or opposing every resurrection. Instead "the
task of international politics is not to inhibit change but to find means to permit
change to proceed without repeatedly shaking the peace of the world.
"
63 This is the
hl Clark, J.J., Admiral, USN, Sea Power and Its Meaning, p. 19, Franklin Watts,
New York, 1966. Approximately 99% of the nation's needed resources travel by
surface ship. There is at least one imported strategic material, for every letter of the
alphabet.
b2George, A. L. & Smoke, R., Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and
Practice, p.611, Columbia University Press, 1974. Quote by Henry Kissinger in 1968.
^Kennan, G. F., Realities of American Foreign Policy, p. 103, Princeton University
Press, 1954.
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meaning of current U.S. policy attempts to deter regional hegemons and counter the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Complicating this goal is the uncertainty of the future structure and
distribution of power within the international system. One such uncertainty concerns
the increasing number of "players" in the system. Each nation state and at times sub-
national groups have their own unique interests, within the "new world order"
(NWO), and each seeks to not only to protect but to enhance these interests.
One troubling dimension of the NWO are the growing asymmetries between
the industrialized world and the Lesser Developed Countries (LDCs). Many LDCs
have begun to claim that the existing patterns of wealth and resource distribution are
a major reason for their inadequate standard of living. This discontent is breeding
contempt for the status quo. Then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles commented
on this nearly 40 years ago:
No wealthy individual can live happily in a community of poverty to which he is
indifferent. It is the same with the society of nations... That is a law of social life and
we cannot violate it except at our peril. 64
The so called third world has become the major source of instability and
violence in the international system. 6 " Although most of the 35 ongoing (1994) sieges
and civil wars throughout the globe, are of a peripheral concern to the United States,
(v4t
Dulles, J.F., Secretary of State, January 17, 1955, Address before the American
Bar Association at Philadelphia, p. 174, Department of State Bulletin, January 31,
1955.
^Snow, D., Distant Thunder, Third World Conflict and the New International
Order, p.l, St. Martins Press, 1993.
49
in terms of "hard" interests, they can have a seriously debilitating impact on global
stability. Religious or ethnic rivalries frequently transcend political frontiers. If these
are the wars of the future, then the both the developed and the developing world
devote adequate resources to meet the challenges.
The third goal is to continue supporting the United Nations (UN), not because
of any utopic vision, but because of its legitimacy and offer of hope for many publics
in Europe, East Asia, and the third world. Events in Bosnia and Somalia highlight
the challenge in meeting this goal, as many of the crisis are of a different character
than the original UN charter was envisioned to address. Multi-lateral solutions are
understandably more complicated, but the United States is the only nation capable of
providing the leadership to overcome some of the present hurdles. Leadership has
its benefits, but also has a price.
Many of the dilemmas the world faces today are not novel. For example,
even though President Roosevelt condemned the atrocities committed during World
War II, claiming that "no right minded man" could "witness such occurrences
without craving the power to prevent them," he also recognized that U.S.
involvement "short of rightful and potential intervention" would accomplish nothing
and possibly do more harm.'"1
As a world leader, the United States is frequently called upon to assist the UN
in overcoming its structural, procedural, and financial shortcomings. Lest we
"Thomas, D. Y., One Hundred Years of The Monroe Doctrine 1823-1923, p. 127,
Macmillan Co, 1923. When the Senate rejected the League of Nations covenant.
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forget, only half a century ago, some Europeans felt that the United States was an
"observer whose presence was not always welcome, because we represented a nation
ready with advice, but equally ready to shun responsibility."67
This goal requires policies which are at times broader than America's own
immediate interests, while remaining within our capability. The United States can
not secure its security in isolation, and future security will continue to be achieved
through cooperation with others. This requires world perspective, and a desire to
contribute to the security and prosperity of other nations.
B. WORLD LEADERSHIP
America's role in the post-Cold War is a subject of hot debate. The idea of
isolationism pervaded the Constitutional Convention of 1787, as Washington, John
Adams, and a host of others warned against permanent alliances and espoused
policies of non-interference.
Our own revolution and independence had gained the freedom of action, and
by exploiting our isolation, the nation could pursue a different course, while avoiding
entanglements in the balance of European power and politics.*5* But even then,
isolationism did not mean a complete withdrawal from world affairs, but as Thomas
Paine claimed "maintaining a maximum amount of freedom of action to protect







tying themselves to the fortunes of any "foreign influence," again emphasizing the
need for American freedom of action70 Finally, on December 2, 1823 the nation
announced the Monroe Doctrine of noncolonization and non-intervention in the
Western hemisphere.
Isolationism may make good sense if economic or security welfare does not
dictate otherwise. Such is the case today, as American interests are so intertwined
and interdependent with other nations abroad, that engagement with the rest of the
world, and world politics has become essential. What is necessary, is to identify
those conflicts that affect U.S. interests; and match them against the country's
international obligations. World leadership demands interests that transcend national
boundaries, an idea whose time is still evolving. "Drift and evasion have the
disadvantage of leaving the country subject to entanglement without the
compensating advantage of providing opportunity to exert control on the world
politics in which we become entangled."71
C. TRANSLATING GOALS INTO OBJECTIVES:
Naval presence is one instrument by which the United States can demonstrate
its commitment in relation to national interests and obligations as a world leader.
Presence requires priorities amongst goals, as each region and / or crisis poses
peculiar threats, challenges, and volatilities. This is difficult, since "geographical




Peffer, N., America's Place in the World, Viking Press, New York, 1945. p.76.
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answers for such questions as: who will be our enemy in the next war; in what
theater of operations will it be fought; and what will be our national objective at the
time?"72
To shape or influence the international environment, the nation must look at
the area(s) in question, and determine what it hopes to accomplish. TABLE 6 points
out several defense related objectives for present planning: 73
(TABLE 6)
REGIONAL BREAKDOWN OF HIGHER LEVEL DEFENSE
PLANNING OBJECTIVES
East Asia Europe Middle East Elsewhere
Environment Creating Creating Demonstrating Precluding rise of
shaping conditions where conditions where that access to major military
(long term) no single power no single power resources is vital power
is seen as military is seen as military U.S. interest
hegemon hegemon
Making arms Making arms Demonstrating Improving






orderly change orderly change
Protecting U.S.




















SOURCE: Davis. P.K.. Finch, L.. Defense Planning for the Post-Cold War Era
72
Pickering, p. 102, Quote by George Marshal in 1938.
7
"Davis, P.K., Finch, L., Defense Planning for the Post-Cold War Era, p. 19, RAND,
National Defense Research Institute, 1993. Authors mention that this is a continuing
theme of RAND work.
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Some of these interests are perhaps perishable, but several are expected to
remain relevant well into the 21st century. Of these interests, forward deployed
naval forces are expected to contribute in the following areas: counter-proliferation;
minimizing economic dangers (danger to imported oil, sea lanes of communication
(SLOC) closure, and instability); humanitarian assistance; deterrence; regional
stability; interoperability with allies; and crisis response. It must be recognized, as
to be pointed out in Chapter V, that given the nature of many low intensity conflicts
(LICs), the application or the threat of military force may not provide conventional
solutions.
This thesis makes no claims as to which geographic areas are expected to be
more important than others in the next century. But it can be assumed that because
South West Asia will continue to hold over two-thirds of the worlds known oil
reserves, and Latin America is of such close proximity, that these two regions will
mandate our paying attention to any political or economic instabilities there.
Regarding Europe, the socio-economic upheavals in Africa, or the continuing shift of
economic and military power towards the Pacific Rim, one must acknowledge the
objectives pointed out in Table 6.
TABLE 7 summarizes the 1994 forward presence mission statements of the
different CINCs:74
74Cook Conference presentation by OPNAV N513, Newport RI, 15-17 March 1994.
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EUCOM USACOM CENTCOM PACOM UTILITY
Timely crisis response X
Credible U.S. Naval Force X













Enforce no fly zones
Provide BMD for allies
Detect / Monitor drug traffic
S.A. Interoperability ???
Surveil / monitor strategic forces
Protect Shipping X
Defend South Korea























Although these objectives apply as seen in 1994, most are considered to be of
fundamental value and of enduring interest to the nation. It appears that corvette
flotillas are especially well suited for several of the above listed missions ( timely
crisis response, secure LOCs, military -military / civil interaction, and protect
shipping), and could at least contribute to the majority of the other missions in one
AOR or another. Chapter V will explore if the flotilla is adequate to meet specific
requirements, looking for both the desirability (effectiveness oi benefits) and
feasibility (practicality).
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In conclusion, the United States has many instruments for pursuing objectives
abroad, for example, trade, diplomacy, alliances, arms transfers, and military
exchanges. Although "our influence will increasingly be defined more by the quality
of our ideas, values, and leadership, and by our competitiveness in the international
market place, than by the predominance of our military capabilities,"75 a robust
American capability remains in the national interest.
These issues touch on the nature of forward military operations, as the Nation
must ask how far forward, and whether the presence stabilizes or escalates a crisis or
arms build-up. Corvette flotillas can not satisfy all of the requirements expected of
forward deployed naval units, but they offer an option worthy of consideration.
They balance several goals which seem important to the Nation as a whole without
sacrificing American commitment as a world leader.
75'
National Security Strategy, p.5.
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V. UNITED STATES NAVAL MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS IN 2010
" 'Command of the sea' in peacetime lies, like beauty, in the eye of the beholder, and
in future it will not be easy to behold." - Sir Julian Corbett
"From the Sea" highlights the centrality of controlling events ashore.7 '1 This is
a radical change from the last 50 years, when the naval force concentrated primarily
on dominating the open ocean conflict with the Soviets. This shift in direction
requires fundamental reassessments, to clear and keep the path open for force
sustainment ashore. This means coping with closer horizons amidst highly contested
littoral shores. Naval forces must remain flexible, capable, and self sufficient, and
when the situation dictates, contribute synergistically to a joint / coalition effort.
It must be remembered that presence, to be effective, requires keeping and
exploiting the initiative, which requires a mix of ships designed for a myriad of
missions. Corvette presence and rapid response capabilities exploit this initiative,
reassure allies of the United State's commitment, and contribute towards general
deterrence. The flotilla is also available to perform a host of non-traditional missions
which are rising in eminence. The risks are obvious, as navies often operate in
"harm's way," and capability is required even in so called "low threat" areas. Figure
2 highlights the framework from which the missions and operations of presence is
envisioned:
7bDepartment of the Navy, "From the Sea, Preparing The Naval Service For the
21st Century," p.l, September 1992 .
57
PRESENCE
RAPID COERCIVE NON REASSURE





FIGURE 2: ESSENCE OF PRESENCE
A. THE LITTORAL "ENVIRONMENT"
Although no nation is capable of challenging American interests on the high
seas today, this is not so in local waters. The diffusion of technology with naval
application is widespread given the increase in offset arrangements ( co-production,
subcontracting, and / or licensing ), and the growing internationalization of military
production. 77 This proliferation will complicate American foreign policy, as the
weapon recipients become more self confident and difficult to influence. "For the
first time in the post World War period, recipient states can acquire enough military
capability to deter, directly threaten, and influence the behavior of states in the
system.
^Krause, K., Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade,




As several hardware trends indicate, several nations are raising the risk and
cost for any external military forces attempting to wield influence in their waters.
Layered multi-dimensional defenses may increasingly be encountered near the
offshore approaches to landing areas, strategic ports, straits, or choke points.
Examples include new air independent diesel electric submarines (AIP), submerged
launched and /or advanced sea-skimming cruise missiles, sophisticated "smart
mines," land-based tactical aircraft, ballistic missiles, and, in the future, space.
Add the complicated geography of many coastlines and the density oi merchant
shipping inshore, and it is clear that warfare in coastal waters will likely prove a
challenging task.
An increasing number of nations are expressing and even demonstrating their
desire to acquire more weapons, sensors, and countermeasures, commensurate with
their security concerns. Although the total force levels have not changed very
much, there are definite signs of qualitative modernization. 7" This trend towards
less quantitv and more quality is a definite sign that several nations intend to raise
the stakes for external powers operating in their local waters. This adds to the
challenge of presence in the littorals.
Depending on one's endowments, most coastal nations recognize the
significance of space based surveillance, navigation, and communication as either an
opportunity or a liability. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that despite
limited resources, several developing countries are investing heavily in maritime
7V
Preston, A., "The Naval Balance," p. 8, Naval Forces, no II, vol XIV, 1993.
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surveillance and /or patrol equipment, recognizing the advantages and need for real
time surveillance / targeting. 80 Although very few nations have adequate space
based capabilities today, various sources are available (ie: French SPOT) if the
recipient is willing to pay for the information. As more coastal states acquire
surveillance capabilities, their tactical intentions become increasingly ambiguous.
All of these factors complicate presence in the littorals, necessitating a
combatant specifically designed to meet the demands of the environment.
B. RAPID RESPONSE
The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and
sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It is responsible for the preparation
of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise
assigned and is generally responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine
warfare, and the protection of shipping.* 1
This section points out how corvettes may be compact vessels, but are more
than "presence on the cheap." They offer a complementary and necessary inshore
component to the fleet, and are able to conduct or contribute to every rapid response
mission. When one recognizes that six corvettes can be maintained forward for one
DDG, or more than 60 for a carrier operating alone, one grasps the flexibility for
tailored presence offered by corvettes. This flexibility can contribute not only to
""Naval Forces , no. VI, vol XIV, 1993, "Submarines for the Third World" & "The
Justification For Naval Forces." p. 16. Examples include: Belize, Cyprus, Guyana,
Jamaica, Seychelles, Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea, Gabon, Mauritania.
81 Department of Defense, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major
Components," p.9, DOD Directive 5100.1,1969, article 10.
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constructive multi-national coalitions, but also complicates the decision process for a
potential adversary.
Figure 3 portrays the two major rapid response mission areas to be










FIGURE 3: RAPID RESPONSE MISSIONS
1. Blockade / Embargo
During the War of 1812 the Royal Navy maintained a tedious yet persistent blockade
off every American port with squadrons of three or four frigates strengthened by a
ship oi the line or two. 82 By May 30, 1814, the blockade held the whole American
East coast in its grip from New Brunswick to Florida.
The imposition of naval embargoes and blockades is a centuries old
measure aimed to influence another nation. Historically, a naval blockade was
designed to not only keep goods and resources from entering the enemy country, but
also to neutralize the opponent's fighting fleet. In the end, as Sir Basil Liddel Hart
described, blockades aim to induce "helplessness which induces hopelessness, and
82 Albion, R.G., and Pope, J. B., Sea Lanes in Wartime, The American Experience
1775-1942. W.W. Norton and Co, 1942. p.118.
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history attests that loss of hope and not loss of lives is what decides the issue of
war."
83
Several studies point out the time and resources required to enforce a
blockade. 84 Air transportation and contiguous land boundaries have complicated the
efficacy of maritime blockades, and the blockade itself often disproportionately
distributes the level of hardship. Yet, the mission seems to be receiving renewed
emphasis. As of early 1994, three blockades were in effect, (Iraq, former Yugoslavia,
and Haiti).
The London Conference of 1909 established several blockading
principles, one being that the blockade must be enforced with adequate forces, vice
simply being declared. If the international community is to continue to view
blockades as a viable option, then several issues must be addressed, namely level of
risk, potential cost, and acceptable duration.
Blockades can no longer be necessarily considered low risk. As
Appendix I points out, numerous coastal countries possess or are acquiring land
and/or naval forces to make blockade enforcement riskier. This may require
blockades at extended distances, which equates to larger areas, and hence more
enforcing platforms.
wUhlig, F., Vietnam: The Naval Story, p. 6, Naval Institute Press, 1986.
^Elliott, K., Hufbauer, G., Schott, J., "Sanctions Work: The Historical Record," pp.
255-259, in M.L. Sifry and C. Cerf (eds.), The Gulf War Reader, Random House,
1991. For example the authors point out that on average, two years were required in
the 35% of cases where sanctions were considered successful since 1914.
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Corvettes are superior platforms for blockading. A flotilla can be
deployed in such a manner as to minimize any local threats facing the blockading
force, and the flotilla provides the numbers of vessels necessary, especially at
extended distances from the shore. Not only do corvettes perform this mission at a
fraction of the cost of an expensive Aegis combatant, but they present numerous
response capabilities should the situation dictate. Of course, the success of the
blockade remains contingent on the degree of seaborne trade the nation against
which the blockade is imposed relies.
a. Vietnam - Operation MARKET TIME
The naval interdiction campaign off the coast of Vietnam is an
example of just how long, expensive, and arduous blockading can be. It must be
remembered that this blockade was an anomaly, in that there was no maritime
threat to the naval ships which moved relativelv risk free.
The length of Vietnam's coastline is over 1,000 miles. On any
given day, thousands of junks, sampans, and trawlers traversed the offshore and
inland waterways, plying their wares of fish, commercial cargo, and, of course, vast
quantities of war fighting materials for the Viet Cong."'' The need to interdict these
supplies became obvious in 1963; the response, "Operation MARKET TIME,"
established patrol areas 30-40 miles deep, 80-100 miles long, off the Vietnam coast/Kb
KUhlig, Vietnam: The Naval Story, p.311. Estimates claim traffic of 50,000 vessels
a year, and that somewhere between 70-97% of the war material arrived by sea.
K,,
IBID, p.281.The Bucklew Report (January 1964), acknowledged the need and
value of a maritime blockade, but remained critical that the success of any sea patrol
was contingent on an accompanying effort to block inland infiltration routes.
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USS Higbee (DD 806), and Black (DD 666) were the first ships
assigned to Market Time ( March 1965). Within a month, the operation was
expanded to include 28 naval ships.87 Even 28 ships proved too few in number for
the area of coverage, and their deep draft often impeded operability in several key
southern areas. The solution was the addition of several 50 foot Swift boats, PCFs
(Patrol Craft Fast), and 82 foot Coast Guard cutters. 8*
Until this time, no naval vessel of less than 210 feet had been
underway more than 35% of the time during the year. Nine Coast Guard cutters,
with 11 rotating crews, were deployed and underway two thirds of the time.
Although mother ships provided fuel and food, the ships became the backbone of
the surveillance force, exploiting their versatility and their minimal need for
logistical support.
If the nation could call these ships up on such short notice, and
against such odds, why not wait again until the contingency of the future drives us
to such action? For one, consider the number ot cutters available in 1965, and those
projected in 2010, when the Coast Guard faces block obsolescence of its cutter fleet. hV
Nonetheless, South Vietnamese patrols reportedly searched 135,911 junks, and in
1964 the number increased to 211,121.
KTBID, p.283.
vH
Schreadley, From the Rivers To The Sea: The United States Navy in Vietnam,
p. 86, Annapolis MD, Naval Institute Press, 1992. The DDs were eventually pulled
out.
w
Stubbs, B.B., Cdr., USCG, "The Need for Coast Guard Cutters in the 21st
Century," An unpublished paper for force planning, National Security Decision
Making Course, Naval Warfare College, 26 October 1990.
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Then consider the increasing number of non-traditional missions off the shores of the
United States, one example being the Chinese and Haitian immigrates which are
arriving almost routinely by sea. The cutters which are enforcing domestic laws and
issues, would have to be pulled off station with great reluctance and penalty.
Resources being tight, and force levels getting smaller, the corvette presents a
complementary alternative.
b. Haiti embargo, 1993
The late 1993 - 1994 quarantine off the coast of Port Au Prince
Haiti, is of a smaller scale, and could be described as a "peripheral issue." Yet, an
international flotilla sits offshore, including ships of the United States (3 guided
missile cruisers [CG], 1 Destroyer [DD], & 2 frigates [FF]), Canadian, French, British,
and Dutch navies.
The area of coverage is relatively small, and Haiti enjoys an
unenforced 241 mile common land border with the Dominican Republic. The
embargo has turned into a waiting game, with the Haitians betting that the West
will lose interest, and eventually renegotiate the terms oi President Aristide's return.
Like its predecessor off the same shoreline in 1963 (against the regime of Papa Doc),
the operation exemplifies the costliness and open-ended duration of a sea-going
blockade.
This embargo is pertinent to the subject at hand for two reasons.
First, it ties up significant assets (six ships from the United States alone) and
resources, which affects other operations and maintenance priorities. Second, the
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Haitian embargo points out the incompatibility and excess of firepower of the
present ships assigned to the task. If a blockade is deemed to be in the national
interest, corvettes can perform the mission at a fraction of the cost of those on
station today.
c. North Korea contingency
For a hypothetical example of a potential blockade in a less
benign environment, consider the possibility of sanctions and a subsequent blockade
being imposed against North Korea. Unclassified reference materials abound
regarding North Korean orders of battle and weapon purchases or exports, and
although the navy is not North Korea's largest military branch, it does reflect a
sizeable investment: From 15 different bases, the following type units operate:
- 21 Romeo and four Whiskey class diesel electric submarines, both able to carry
torpedoes or mines. Additionally over 50 midget submarines are reported
operational.
- Three old STYX firing frigates, 387 Patrol and coastal combatants, three big gun
corvettes, 45 STYX armed missile craft, 173 torpedo craft.
- two SILKWORM regiments at six sites
- 240 SA-2 Surface to Air missile (SAM) sites, 36 SA-3, 24 SA-5. *°
As can be seen, this force may not be state of the art, but it is
designed for extensive layered defenses in support of a sea denial role. Aside from
the forces mentioned above, tactical air craft, mobile ballistic missile batteries, and, of
course, mines, should be expected to be part of any North Korean battle plan. Also
90The Military Balance 1993-1994, Brassey's For the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS), London, 1993.
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consider how many vessels would be required to patrol the 2,495 km North Korean
coastline.
A blockade requires not only adequate numbers of ships, but also
ships able to protect themselves. It is unclear how many and of what configurations,
the CINC would receive for a hypothetical North Korean contingency (MRC), but
given past record, North Korea would be expected to be truculent at best. It is
unlikely that there would be a six month grace period to build up forces.
d. Visit, board, search, inspection (VBSI)
United States merchant vessels were interdicted during the 19th century, as they
reluctantly tolerated the visit and search by British warships, supporting the abolition
of slavery.
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This mission is commonly, but not always, performed in support
of a maritime blockade. From the time sanctions were imposed against Iraq until
the ceasefire (March 3, 1991), 7,645 ships were intercepted, of which 960 were
boarded.92
Whether enforcing UN resolutions in the Adriatic or conducting
drug interdiction operations, it is clear that corvettes can perform the mission at a
fraction oi the cost presently being incurred.
There are plenty of coastlines around the world where blockades
may be considered, and as can be seen from TABLE 8, these coastlines could require
91Hagan, K. T.. American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy 1877-1889, p.96,
Greenwood Press, 1973.
92Gimblett, R., Lieutenant (N), Multinational Naval Operations: The Canadian
Navy in the Persian Gulf 1990-1991," pp. 25-31, Canadian Defence Quarterly, August
1992.
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several ships, often as part of a multi-national effort. As demonstrated in the past,
small ships in adequate numbers are required to effectively perform the mission.
TABLE 8: COASTLINES
COUNTRY COAST # of PORTS RISK
Iran 3,180 (km) 6 high
Iraq 58 3 low
Libya 1,170 6 low
N. Korea 2,495 6 high
Haiti 1,771 2 low
Liberia 579 1 low
2. Battle space management
We need some warships "whose mission is to sink, burn, and destroy,'... a duty
nobler in every sense of the word and one that more exactly fulfills the ideal for
every true hearted sailor.93
Should sanctions prove inadequate, it may be necessary to step up the
pressure. "Operating forward buys reaction time, as the force sets out to dominate
what "From the Sea" calls the "expanding and contracting battlespace."94 Local
battlespace control includes the fleet's "sea, air, and land environments." The extent
of the battlespace to be controlled depends largely on the range of the enemies
weapons. This battlespace is three dimensional (up, out, down), and is described in
the Bottom up Review as:
93iHagan, p. 50. Quote by Lt J.C. Soley in the late 19th Century, claiming that "to
look upon our navy as commerce destroyers is making a grave mistake."
44
"From the Sea," p. 5.
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1.
The area from the open ocean to the shore which must be controlled to support
operations ashore.
2. The area inland from shore that can be supported and defended directly from
the sea.
This section describes how a corvette flotilla can contribute to battle space
management requirements. With superior assimilating, correlating, and relaying of
scouting information, corvettes give the lie to the claim that smaller equates to
incapable.
a. Sanitize area
When diplomacy breaks down and war threatens, the navy is
tasked to establish sea control in the area(s) of interest for the purpose of mounting
offensive operations and to ensure the flow of men and material. The mission
emphasizes the "any time any place" credo associated with naval forward deployed
forces.
Consider the littoral regions that may need to be sanitized; the
offshore approaches to a landing area, strategic port, strait, or choke point come
readily to mind see (Figure 4). In order to be successful, the force must be prepared
to destroy the gamut of options available to an adversary, eventually close to his
shores. Moving men and material across the ocean is noteworthy but proves faint
unless the last few miles can be controlled. Forward deployed corvettes can offer a















5. La Perouse Strait i. :
6. Tsushima Strait .;"
7. Luzon Strait
.£,>-; j
8. Torres Strait %-';>:"£
9. Lombok Strait~^£;
10. Sunda Strait -•>. -
11. Straits of Malacca
12. Strait of Hormuz
13. Bab al Mandab
_.
14. Madagascar Channel
15. Cape of Good Hope
:
', -^ 16. Panama Canal
-
''-'..
^ 17. MonaPassage . ";.,-.,
\~\i 18. Straits of Florida '.>. *.,
:.r:' 19. Suez Canal : . . ^
"&.}: 20. Strait of Gibraltar '/.
Middle East oil exports.— 1992T (millions of tonnes) -
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SOURCE: International Defense Review, August 1993, p.614.
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Two warfare areas that are critical in many littoral operations are
air superiority and naval gunfire support (NGFS). The contribution of the corvette is
considered minimal in both areas. When a formidable air threat is possible, then
external anti-air assets, from either an Aegis or the CVBG are required. This forces
the question, whether corvettes will drive an adversary to build up air forces to
overcome a relative weakness ? Invariably opponents try to exploit another's
weakness, but since the flotilla is part of a larger force when required, the impact
should prove not as critical. It must be remembered, each corvette possesses
formidable soft and hard kill anti-air systems, but they are for point defense, not air
supremacy.
The second shortcoming deals with using the less than optimal 76
mm gun for NGFS. Experiments are being conducted with vertical-launched fire
support missiles, but considering the limited package, corvettes are not ideally suited
for this capability. But besides onboard ordnance, the corvette can shuttle various
air assault packages (latest equivalent of UAVs, and SH-60s with a variety of
cannons, missiles, and various countermeasure payloads. This aspect or the landing
of assets launched from other units could prove invaluable.
b. Strike
This is where coercion takes on the violent aspect of diplomacy.
Strike implies touching targets onshore as well as off, in support of the "contracting
and expanding battle space." It is the projecting of naval power inland or at sea,
against the enemies points of vulnerability or menace. Among strike assets available
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(attack manned aircraft, amphibious landing, precision unmanned munitions) the
Tomahawk (TLAM) land or sea attack cruise missile is expected to play a larger role
in keeping the enemy off balance. Myers points out the potential of the TLAM,
which is able to strike various targets at a reduced cost and less of the political
burden associated with air crews. 95
Whether concentrating on sanitizing the AOR or striking the
enemies point(s) of vulnerability, future operations require ships designed to operate
in high risk areas. There is a need to augment the present forces with less expensive
ships, in adequate numbers, physically dispersed, yet capable of concentrating their
aggregate firepower. This requires ships designed for specific missions that can
expand the depth of the force.
A flotilla of TLAM carrying corvettes operating in a dispersed
formation with a concentrated fire capability provides the force with greater standoff
range and combat radius than most adversaries. Although Tomahawk performs
well against large targets, they are ill-suited for many smaller targets, which like
NGFS, may warrant the airborne assault packages launched from a variety of
dispersed flight decks. Clearly some targets do not warrant a TLAM attack.
Nonetheless, the importance of the TLAM importance is
increasing as well as its performance, especially with the decreasing numbers of
carriers and long range attack air craft, and the increasing number of surface
95Myers, Charles E.; Naval Institute Press; "Time to Fold 'em;" July 1991.
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combatants with vertical launch capability. The range of the conventional land
attack version exceeds 700 nm, which is comparable to that of an unrefueled A-6.
Corvettes allow the Nation to take full advantage of its naval
superiority. The dispersal of a well armed TLAM corvette flotilla during a strike
mission, greatly complicates the opponent's targeting, increasing the probability that
some will survive any massed attack. This should discourage a preemptive strike
by an opponent, since not only is it incrementally harder to get that one debilitating
blow, but recourse could be expected to follow.
C. Safeguard sea-borne trade and reinforcements
In 1893, an uprising threatened the friendly Brazilian government. Although
President Cleveland hoped to remain neutral, several United States exporters,
including Standard Oil, warned that their trade was endangered. The president
responded by ordering Naval units to enter the Brazilian ports, with orders to protect
the United States shippers that wanted to unload their goods in the Brazilian ports.%
For years, the traditional mission of navies worldwide was to
protect seaborne trade and cultivating foreign markets. Although economic trade and
volume patterns have changed dramatically, the United States is more reliant than
ever before on foreign markets, resources, and sources of energy. In the next century,
this movement of cargo, which forward presence influences, will continue to rely on
the seas.
Although the West often took for granted the maritime flow of




the Iran / Iraq war, over 400 vessels were attacked by both belligerents.97 Operation
"Preying Mantis" and "Earnest Will" involved the escorting of reflagged Kuwaitti oil
tankers during the Iran/Iraq war. The oil tankers were picked up as they transited
the Strait of Hormuz, and escorted throughout the transit to Kuwait.
Another area that will in all likelihood be revisited, is the landing
and support of troops ashore in some hostile land. As Colin Gray put it: "Seapower
is about the use of maritime lines of communication for the effective interconnection,
organization, and purposeful application of the warmaking potential of many lands.
Seapower is about the transfer of the power of the production base on land at times
and to places of strategic choice. "^ The transfer of this power requires the
unimpeded flow of goods across the oceanic sea lanes. Ensuring this transport of
men and material across the oceans has always been a critical determinant in
extended warfare, as the timely arrival of supplies can spell the difference between
success and failure.
As mentioned earlier, the mission does not stop with the landing
itself, as the troops must be supported, perhaps for months on end. Several potential
aggressors are acquiring the capability to harass and hinder shipping, at least in
M
Russo, F.V, "Neutrality at Sea in Transition; State Practice in the Gulf War as
Emerging International Customary Law;" p.l, Naval War College Review, 25 May
1988. No maritime nation was immune from the attacks, as vessels from over 30
neutral countries were attacked, which included all five permanent members of the
UN Security Council.
wGray, C. S., and Barnett, R. W., Seapower and Strategy, p.21-23, Naval Institute
Press, Annapolis, MD, 1989.
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their local waters. This affects the nation as we must re-learn how to escort with
limited assets available. During this time, the inshore forces surrender tremendous
tactical advantage, in that their movements are predictably within a given area of
operations.
It is postulated that corvettes can assist with ensuring that the 25
afloat pre-positioned ships (APF) are able to deploy from their various forward
ports, and that these ships and any others are able to land when and where desired.
This is not to suggest that the U.S. must prepare for another "blue water" convoy
campaign, but that potential opponents, 15 years from now, are likely to have at least
minimal capability to disrupt shipping crucial to the campaign. Figure 5 depicts the
concept of how the corvettes are envisioned to escort and protect high value military











FIGURE 5: CORVETTE "POINT" ESCORTS
Source: Meyer, p. 82.
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Attacking the enemies commerce, or "guerre de course," has
never been decisive in past wars, but there is no doubt as to the effectiveness and
uncertainty of both World Wars caused by German U-boats. Technology has
improved the potential of and consider that container ships carry significantly more
cargo today, such that the loss of even one ship could prove catastrophic to the
campaign. During World War II, cargoes were interspersed among various ships to
preclude such disaster, but what is important, is that it may be easier and more
attractive for a weaker power to strike at an artery vice the heart.
The Korean and Vietnam Wars, and Desert Storm were
anomalies in that there was no significant threat to the maritime re-supply.
Considering that over 95% of the war material typically moves by sea and assuming
a pragmatic opponent, this lifeline may not go unchallenged in the next crisis.
Commercial satellite information and predicted routes and speeds of advance, give
'guerre de course' an aura of relevance. Why rest solely on sea denial, if battle is
eminent?
Since corvettes are forward deployed for one reason, which is to
operate in littoral waters even at the risk of losing some of them. If corvettes are to
be considered, the local threat must be first assessed, and an appropriate force
package assembled. Corvette flotillas could assist with the controlling, seizing, and
denying, given a low threat AAW environment and the proper tactics. But corvettes
do not perform all tasks, and as the risk level increases, they would require external
air support from various space, naval, and joint assets.
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Following the tremendous loss of shipping, during both World
Wars, nations found they needed more destroyers to fight these type of inshore
operations. Corvettes can protect the convoys during the trans-oceanic voyage and
near the terminal points oi ingress and egress, much as 1500 ton combatants that
routinely accompanied and protected convoys across the Atlantic Ocean during
World War II.
C COERCIVE DIPLOMACY
"A navy was not merely an agency for territorial defense, but also an instrument with
which to compel respect for the other material interests and policies.
"
w
Coercion or " violent diplomacy," has been described as exploiting one's
capability to inflict pain. This involves communicating a threat, and then
convincing the opponent, that "any pain inflicted will be commensurate on his
behavior, and relief can be found only upon accommodation." Coercion, if
successful, favorably channels your opponents motivations, vice striving to simply
overcome his strength. 100
Coercion has two complementary yet unique "faces:" deterrence and
compellence. An understanding of this concept is necessary, as is recognition of
those factors which have contributed to success (and failure) of each. Although there
Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, p.21. Quote by James Madison.
'""Schelling, Thomas C, Arms and Influence , p. 5, Yale University Press, 1966.
Convincing your opponent that surrender or acquiescence are his best alternative as
compared to persistence.
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is no guarantee of future success, such an understanding does provide a stronger
perspective in making decisions regarding national security.
1. Deterrence:
"The regular visits of a warship would have "an excellent moral effect" on the native
populations." 101
Deterrence has been called the primary and central motivating purpose
underlying American military strategy. This fundamental objective for America's
armed forces equates to being able to " deter aggression and, should deterrence fail,
to defend the nation's vital interests against any potential foe." 102 Presence is a form
of deterrence. Corvettes can contribute in a limited way.
Deterrence can be defined as the art of persuasion, or the convincing of
an opponent, that the long (and short) term costs and / or risks, of a given course
of action outweigh any benefits which can be expected. Although this concept is
straightforward, the process is complex, the execution can be risky, and the outcome
not always certain. The challenge is to influence without encountering resistance or
prompting escalation leading to outright war.
Numerous studies have attempted to correlate objectives, determination,
morale, perceptions, etc, with probabilities of deterrence failure /success. In most of
these studies, "causal correlations proved inadequate, which is perhaps attributable to
the dynamism of the intervening variables, which often can not be pre-defined with
iDi
102
Hagan, p.114. Commander Charles Huntington of the USS ALERT in Dec 1880.
National Military Strategy, p. 6.
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coded values." 103 George and Smoke demonstrate how several other dimensions of
deterrence, besides those associated with objectives or means, become more complex
at the lower levels of threat. Nowhere is this more true than in today's political
environment. Assessing causal relationships is difficult, because there is no sure way
to calculate an opponent's cost/ benefit calculus; when an opponent does refrain from
certain actions, there are often no external signs to substantiate that deterrence has
"worked."
When talking about deterrence, the United States specifically engages in
what Huth refers to as "extended deterrence," which implies a nation's commitment
to a third party (protege) against external aggression (See Figure 6). This extended
deterrence takes on two dimensions based on the immediacy and probability of the
threat. The first, "extended-immediate deterrence" refers to a "confrontation between
adversaries in which the perception of armed conflict is highly probable unless one
side backs down." The second, "general-extended deterrence," refers to political and
military competition between a potential attacker and defender in which the
possibility of an armed conflict over another state is present, but the potential
attacker is neither actively considering the use of force nor engaging in a
confrontation that threatens war." The defender allocates resources and deploys
"^George & Smoke, p.91. For example another deterrence study conducted nearly
30 years ago by Bruce Russett, claimed that the "critical success or failure factor," is
the "credibility of the defender's commitment to the pawn." Examining 17 cases,
where a major power attempted to deter an attack on a pawn, Russet found that only
one factor, economic interdependence (% of the pawns imports provided by the
defender), demonstrated a high degree of deterrence "success."
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military forces for various contingencies of armed attack, even though there is no
imminent threat of attack. m The first task is to determine if and how forward
deployed corvettes might contribute to extended deterrence.
?K
MOIEGEh ^111
FIGURE 6: EXTENDED DETERRENCE
One of several variables that Huth tested was the local balance of
military forces. He constructed three measures of this balance (immediate, short
term, and long term) against three possible strategies the attacker might take (limited
aims, rapid offensive attack, and war of attrition). 105
in4Huth, P.K., Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, p. 16-17, Yale
University Press, 1988. Analyzed 58 historical cases of extended-immediate
deterrence from 1885-1984 (34 occurred before WW-II, and 24 after the WW-II).
10TBID, 57-61. Immediate balance is defined as those forces of the attacker in
position to attack, and those forces of the defender and protege in position to
immediately repulse the attack. The short term balance is defined as the capacity of
the attacker, defender, and protege to augment the immediate balance of forces by
mobilizing peacetime reserves, measuring the potentially effective strength of both
sides in the first few months. Long term is the capacity of all parties to build up
existing forces by mobilizing the economy and civilian population for war.
80
In the limited aim attack, the attacker seeks a quick, low cost military
victory, a fait accompli pulled off before the victim or defender can respond. In a
rapid offensive strike, the time frame is measured in weeks or months, allowing
mobilization of the attacker to augment the victim state attacked. Huth's analysis
revealed that the immediate and short term balance of forces have significant effect
on the probability of deterrence success.""'
Would a flotilla of corvettes tilt the local balance of forces, reflecting
capability to repulse an attack? Based on Huth's research, corvettes are not suitable
for immediate-extended deterrence, though this would depend on the quality of the
aggressor relative to the protege'. Corvettes could only be considered as an
augmenting capability with a larger force. But it is hypothesized that the flotilla can
contribute to general deterrence, when attack is not imminent.
Consider an adversary who contemplates attack. He performs the
following calculation : P(C + R) > (1-P) B, where
P = probability of U.S. action in support of a 3rd party
C = cost to the aggressor to defend against the pawn & U.S. action
R = the risk (or penalty) to the aggressor, of action from the pawn
and the U.S.
B = expected benefits to the aggressor
(1-P) = the probability of U.S. inaction, in support of a 3rd party 107
This proposition highlights that the attacker's cost/benefit analysis is
based upon on the probability (P) of the defender taking action. Of course much is
context-driven, for example the relative strategic importance of the protege or region,
l,,hIBID, p.74.
l,,7George & Smoke, p.60.
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the distances involved, and the makeup and structure of U.S. military forces in the
area (and in general). Since much rests on the fear of retribution, as pointed out
earlier, the sword must be heavy enough.
Forward deployed flotillas reduce the transit time which equates to
quicker response. As the "advantage in numbers" section pointed out, the adversaries
decision making process is greatly complicated, as he no longer can concentrate on
just a few platforms. Each corvette impacts the campaign in some way, raising the
cost and risk for the adversary, and despite a reluctance to become militarily
involved, should the stakes dictate, corvettes can go in and fight where the risk is
high.
Again, the United States may be moving in a world where deterrence
and compellence take on different meaning, complicating the decision of just how
much and to what degree of presence is required. Corvettes are only an augmenting
force, capable of limited action.
2. Compellence:
Compellence by contrast, takes a more proactive approach.
Schelling points out that where deterrence says "if you cross this line I will...," and
suppresses enemy action, compellence says "I will do 'X, to you unless you do 'Y,."
and requires the enemy to do something. Compellence retains the benefits of
initiative and momentum, and forces the opponent to act, to avoid collision.
Compellence can be intrusive, hostile, and provocative, and requires a minimal time
period to wait. It has definite objectives, has a deadline, and treads a fine time line
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in striving to keep the pressure on, while still providing the opponent time and an
avenue to yield. Communication is crucial, as it limits some of the uncertainty. 10s
To understand how compellence can be expected to fare in general, it
helps to assess its use during the Cold War, when the United States used military
force hundreds of times "to underscore verbal and diplomatic expressions of
American foreign policy. "m
Examining the effectiveness of this military force as a political
instrument, Blechman and Kaplan conducted a study that looked at the significance
of variations in force strength, tactics, and other strategic stratagems. What their
study revealed, is that armed force, by itself, is unable to sustain a large proportion
of favorable outcomes over the longer term.""
A summary of the outcomes are noted: If the use of force was intended
to assure or deter behavior, results indicated 90%> short term success and 64% long
term success. If the intent was to compel or induce behavior, the results were
noticeably lower, with 59% success in the short term, and 19% in the long. 111
Results indicated that even when "favorable" and desired outcomes
were obtained in the short term (six months), the longer term (three years)
consequences were not always apparent. Examples of some unforeseen
10h
Schelling, p.72.




consequences include the former adversary increasing the size and capability of his
armed force, developing new weapon systems, and at times, a strengthening his
resistance. In conclusion, military operations, at least during the Cold War, were not
always permanent remedies for difficult international situations. At best, they gained
time for other forms of diplomacy. 112
3. Perceptions
"If we send only missionaries and whalers to seas where other nations send men-of-
war and merchant steamers, we can hardly expect savages to respect the power of
the nation or the rights of its citizens." 113
Negotiations and even military action are influenced by the perceptions
held on both sides of the table. As history attests, commitment, costs, benefits, and
risks cannot be portrayed or determined by capability alone. Assessing motivations
and principles quickly proves a humbling process, attributable to the elusiveness
and scarcity of information, and the lack of meaningful feedback. 114
Recognizing the existence of different cognitive maps, it is no wonder
that perceptions of naval capability and oi political and military will, can be
misconstrued. Yet perception is the essence of presence, a central dynamic that is
continually reassessed and reapplied. This perception influences options and actions






United States chooses to influence (coerce - deter and/or compel) beyond its
geographic borders.
How much have times changed from the the 19th century, when the
sending of a naval squadron represented a "ritual demonstration of commitment,"
and the size of the force served as an indicator of the nation's commitment? 11 " A
credible navy must still be perceived as fully combat capable, a force ready to
become "actual" when and where deemed necessary- The force should be as
logistically independent of host nations as possible, and be capable of maintaining
station abroad for indefinite periods. Also, the political will to use the force when
necessary must be perceived.
The world is watching the dynamics of the United State's military
drawdown. Funding for defense research and development is being deferred to
meet present operational commitments, and the commitments themselves are
increasingly having to be gapped because of unavailable forces. Another factor
alluded to earlier, is the increasing fleet operational time away from homeport
(OPTEMPO). This variable is obviouslv critical when assessing the fighting potential
and morale of the force.
Port calls and multi-national exercises are indications of goodwill,
friendship, and cooperation, but when national resolve or capability are perceived to
be weak, then forward presence may encounter challenges. In the past, such
perceptions have instilled overconfidence by aggressors, led to miscalculation by all
'"George and Smoke, p. 16.
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sides, and eventually inspired numerous actions, that at the time, were considered
low-risk.
Corvettes offer a unique ability to exploit the mobility and initiative
that sea borne forces offer. The flotilla offers a complementary addition to those
forces forward deployed, positively influencing the emerging international
environment. First, the mere presence of the ships signals commitment, and based on
the number and configuration of the flotilla, the adversary receives clear and
unambiguous signals of U. S. political and military resolve.
More times than not, in peace and hostilities, a flotilla of corvettes
signals an appreciation of the needs and realities of the time, and demonstrates that
the United States desires to remain engaged. It must be remembered that corvettes
maintain a qualitative edge with their space-supported detect, track, and engagement
capability, but their air defenses will be limited to point defense. Should an
overwhelming air threat be present, than the forces require external air cover.
With the numbers of expensive combatants getting scarce, and the fact
that there are no "quick" replacements, expensive warship liabilities can outweigh
their unparalleled capabilities. The high cost of procurement can influence the
nation's willingness to take risks, and present the operational commanders with a
dilemma: establish sea control while preserving at all costs, the "irreplaceable handful
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of capital ships.
1 "1 Corvettes offer a solution by their "application of appropriate
naval force at the decisive point, at the decisive moment." 117
4. Risks
Forward presence implies operating in littoral waters or "near land"
areas of the world. These waters are often confined and congested, and pose several
unique challenges due to their proximity to land. The risks are great for any
warship, and may increasingly be so, especially for a navy designed to fight in open
waters. The nation needs a ship designed to fight in restricted waters that reflects
the American will to employ and risk it, if necessary.
Understanding that the international political climate often shifts
suddenly, forward deploying naval forces entails an inherent level of risk. Corvettes,
like any military option, present unique capabilities and limitations which must be
understood. It is well to remember that there is no such thing as an invulnerable
ship. The probability of a "mission kill" from a single hit can approach 100 %," H and
neutralizing the high value or support ship, curtails the utility and reduces the
survivability of the rest of the battle force.
""Rosinski, H., The Development of Naval Thought, p.107 & 109, edited by B. M.
Simpson III, Naval War College Press, 1977. Japanese staffs were faced with the
same dilemma during the attacks on Port Arthur (1904-1905) and Pearl Harbor.
ll7Cable, J., Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1979, Political Applications of Limited Naval
Force
, p.56-57, St. Martin's Press, 1981.
" HKehoe, J.W. Capt, USN (Ret), "Warship Design in the Future," p. 149, George,
James L. (editor), The U.S. Navy, The view from the Mid-1980's.
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Strategy has always been an exercise in risk evaluation and reduction,
with risk being defined as the difference between potential threats and a nation's
capability to counter the threats. 119 This risk is a two edged sword, as each side
attempts to raise the actual or perceptual level of intolerability. Such is the basis
behind several regional military build-ups today, much as pre-World War I
Germany's "risk theory", which was to build a fleet large enough that the British
would dare not risk fighting the Royal Navy in war. 120
Whether showing the flag during a portcall, or steaming off foreign
shores, presence is potentially provocative, especially, during a crisis or conflict of
interests. History demonstrates the recurring nature of misperception and
miscalculation, amidst the "spiral of escalation." Although most action is intended
before a crisis spreads, the process often quickly gets out of control. Uncertainty
exists, both internal and external, as each party continually reassesses the other's
resolve. Transition to a general war is always a distinct possibility, whether or not
intended, especially when either side fears losing face. This brinkmanship, or the
competition and manipulation of risk taking, carries the risk of disaster. 121 Even on
those occasions when coercion succeeds, the success is often ephemeral, and "the
U9Drew, Dennis M. COL, & Snow Donald, Making Strategy: An Introduction to
National Security Processes and Problems, p. xv, Air University Press, G.P.O., 1988.
12
"Murray, Williamson, "Naval Power inWW I," Seapower and Strategy, p. 188.
121
Shelling, p. 114. Schelling takes the discussion beyond the scope of this paper,
as he discusses the nuclear dimension.
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consequences of continued frustration, are not easily predictable and are not
necessarily benign." 122
The use of corvette flotillas cannot be risk free; neither is the use of any
naval warship. Risk, if improperly used "can bring national decline and a loss of
temporal power and greatness." 123 To keep the level of risk commensurate with the
objective, the political and military planners must understand what is the "preferred
terminal situation." 124
D. MARITIME "NON-TRADITIONAL" SOURCES OF DISPUTE
In the 1820s, the USNs most immediate and urgent tasking was the protection of
American commerce. The scattered squadrons of small, fast vessels, patrolling and
pirate chasing, became more useful than ships of the line or even frigates. 12 ^
Since the end oi the Cold War, several non-traditional missions have risen in
prominence, and present unique challenges for naval forces. The challenge is
finding the proper balance between assets to support non-traditional contingencies
(ie: high seas terrorism, freedom of navigation, pollution, fishing rights, piracy, etc),
without sacrificing the capability to deter or succeed in a "traditional" warfighting
campaign.
122George & Smoke, p. 5. may only be temporarily deterred, awaiting more





Although the U. S. Navy is not specifically built with non-traditional missions
in mind, their expanding popularity is increasingly impacting naval operations in
terms of time, assets, and budget resources. This section explores what role these
non-traditional missions might play in the twenty-first century, and what type of
naval forces is required.
The ships which make up the present naval force structure were conceived,
designed, appropriated, and deployed with open ocean conflict in mind. The
problem, as Van Creveld points out, is that if militaries devote their resources
towards conventional threats visioned in previous wars, they may easily come up
short in the future. 12 '1 With nui, jrous contingencies, the military planner must choose
from among a myriad oi tradeoffs, and obviously cannot prepare for everything. The
challenge is that overemphasis in one area, if it proves to be the wrong area, could
prove not only costly, but consequential.
1. Law of the sea (LOS)
For years Denmark collected dues on vessels passing through the sound, into the
Baltic. Many nations objected, and during a conference in 1856, the major powers
agreed to pay Denmark to discontinue the tax. The U.S. assessment was $393,01
1
12 '
Much has been written concerning the Third United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). This section points out that incidents stemming
from "creeping jurisdiction" are expected to intensify in the twenty-first century as
126Van Creveld, M., The Transformation of War, The Free Press, 1991.
127Thomas, p. 140.
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nations increasingly perceive the presence of foreign warships off their coast as an
affront to their sovereignty. Future challenges to the old Roman principle that the
seas are the commonwealth of mankind are a major non-traditional challenge
affecting future naval policy.
a. UNCLOS III
UNCLOS III has been described as "the largest, most technically
complex, continuous negotiation attempted in modern times." This is understandable
given the diversity of interests of the developed against non-developed, coastal
against land-locked, and resource-rich against resource-poor nations. A solution
was finally reached only by grouping the key issues into packages. 12*
On November 16, 1993, Guyana became the 60th nation to ratify
UNCLOS III, providing the required number of signatories to bring the convention
into force.
124 The treaty, which the United States has adopted except for the
provision concerning deep sea bed mining, is scheduled to become international law
on November 16, 1994. Because of the charter's "package deal" character, several
countries are contesting the right of the United States to selectively honor those
aspects of the treaty considered beneficial, while refusing the sea bed issue. The
12
*Friedheim, Negotiating the New Ocean Regime, pp. 5 and 73, University of
South Carolina, 1993. This book does a superb job of displaying the movement of
support among the various sub-groups. Chapter three describes the trade-offs,
packages, and the side payments that were required to reach consensus. Major
issues surrounded the development and distribution of near-shore and deep-ocean
resources, and the preservation of ship transit rights.
124Broad, W.J., "Plan to Carve Up Ocean Floor Riches Nears Fruition," pp. B5 to
B6, New York Times. March 29, 1993.
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United States has countered in the past by insisting that unrestricted transit has
always been a part of common law, therefore UNCLOS III granted no new rights.
Although it remains unclear whether the United States will trade navigation rights
for "nodules," the issue is expected to rise in eminence.
Measured by the amount of near-shore ocean real estate placed
under national jurisdiction, the United States did very well by UNCLOS III. Not only
did the United States acquire in excess of 3.9 billion acres in the EEZ,m but the
Navy is able to roam the oceans, more than 12 miles from shore, and is able to transit
through archipelagic and international straits.
This thesis does not go into the specific passage rights through
the various bodies of water, as numerous sources are available on the subject. But
several high points are mentioned as they pertain to the movement of naval vessels
in the 21st century. With the changing geopolitical structure, many lesser developed
countries (LDCs) are beginning to feel cheated by the cost and benefit of UNCLOS
III. The traditional concept of freedom of navigation (FON) is increasingly coming
under challenge. Several of these rights have been heavily contested by many
African and Arab LDCs, notably the claim that freedom ot navigation (FON) through
their EEZs, or transit passage through their straits, implies approval for gunboat
diplomacy. 171 So far these nations have been unable to mobilize support, as other




getting their goods to western markets. The exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which
extends to 200 miles from the baseline, is receiving more emphasis, because these
waters cover 36% of the world's oceans (see Figure 7) ni Many nations are
structuring their maritime forces to patrol the waters. But it is the "creeping
jurisdiction" in archipelagic waters that is increasingly causing alarm, as
UNCLOS III has changed the status and transit rights of vast tracts of water from
international to internal waters. 1 ** For now the archipelagic states and the
international community have created sea lanes for the major shipping routes, but
foreign ships have lost the right to roam these now "internal" waters. "Transit
passage," can not be taken for granted, especially when one considers that 135
international straits fall within a 12 mile territorial sea overlap. 1 *4
n2Chichester, M., "Multi National Naval Cooperation in a Changing World," Navy
International, p.54, March 1992, Vol 97, no.3.
133 Philippines, Indonesia (1400 islands), Fiji, and Mauritius are a few nations with
archipelagic baselines.
m Greene, J.K. , "Freedom of Navigation: New strategy for the Navy's FON
Program", p.8, Naval War College, 13 February, 1992.
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FIGURE 7: The 200 mile EEZ.
Source: K. Booth, Law Force and Diplomacy at Sea, George Allen and Unwin, 1985.
b. Freedom of navigation (FON)
The U.S. Navy's Freedom of Navigation (FON) program
exercises and asserts American navigation and overflight rights throughout the
world, and carries an inherent amount of risk. Some claims, for example the 200
mile territorial sea claim by El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama connote less risk
than others, for exami. ibya's claim in the Gulf of Sidra (military action in 1981
and 1986). Challenging .\e sovereign claims of another falls on the edge of
provoking response, and requires care to control any risk of escalation.
The timely deployment and support of U. S. military forces
abroad require unencumbered freedom of navigation. If the United States desires to
maintain a role in world leadership, than it must be prepared to underwrite freedom
of navigation rights. But a billion dollar Aegis warship is not always the best ship to
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enforce the right. Gone are the days when a warship can demonstrate its "peaceful
intent" by 'letting fly it's topsail', training its guns fore and aft, with their breeches
covered. 135 Any corvettes performing FON must be alert.
2. Multinational cooperation
protecting American interests (in China), to the extent permitted was often
inadequate given the resources devoted, and the vast distances between ports and
expanses of ocean. As such, American warships often cooperated in a unified front,
with European counterparts, for the protection of western lives and property. 1Hb
With the Cold War over, asymmetries among allies are becoming more
evident as the key security concern which brought the alliances together diminishes.
Such is the dilemma of not just who to ally with, but also what should the alliance be
about. Should it be permanent or ad-hoc, and what are the advantages and costs of
each? The United States must remain selective and discriminating in its commitment
to alliances, and no commitment is ever absolute.
The United States cannot be sure who its coalition partners will be next
vear, much less next century. This makes the building of effective military forces,
capable of operating together, tough. U.S. Naval ships are incompatible with the
majority of the world's navies whose maritime interests and forces are designed for
the contiguous zones (CZs). Even in the best of circumstances, multinational naval
operations are difficult, often plagued by incompatibilities. But multinational
n
Till, G., Modern Sea Power




operations are expected to increase in light of the downsizing of American military
forces at home and abroad.
With the exception of NATO, U.S. warships are not specifically
designed to operate with allies. The corvette offers compatibility without sacrificing
capability, providing numerous indirect benefits.
3. Piracy / Mass migration / Drug traffic / Peacekeeping (PK)
Maritime piracy has been around since ships and their cargoes traversed
the high seas. It still exists, with attacks increasing off the coasts of West Africa,
Brazil, Columbia, Ecuador, the Hong Kong - Hainan - Luzon Triangle, and the
Singapore and Malacca Straits. This activity is particularly risky in the latter area,
for with little room to maneuver, a ship under attack may ground or collide with
another, thereby causing enormous ecological and economic damage. 117 Since most
littoral states lack the capability to alleviate the problem, this is one area which may
require increased multi-national cooperation, to which corvettes could contribute.
In 1893 President Cleveland rejected requests from Americans living in Hawaii for
annexation. This lack of interest disappeared in 1897, when President McKinley
received news that two Japanese warships had entered Hawaiian waters, in protest
of US immigration laws. By 1897 the Japanese population on Hawaii was a majority,
with over 25,000 people, accounting for over 1/4 of the Hawaiian population. 11*
n7
Scott, David L. LCDR, USCG, "Piracy, Terrorism, and Crime at Sea," p.l,
colloquium on Maritime Security and Conflict Resolution, Centre for Foreign Policy
Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax Nova Scotia, Canada, June 1993. The Straits of
Malacca (500 miles long) typically has 5000-6000 ships a month transit its narrow
waterway. Many of these ships are ultra large oil tankers that exceed 250,000 tons.
n
*LaFeber, p. 191. the Japanese population outnumbered the Americans,
Europeans, and even the Hawaiians themselves.
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Malthusian predictions are being made again, as a new cycle of
overpopulation and undernourishment is being experienced in several of the world's
poorest countries. Current growth rates are expected to double every 25 years in
parts of the world least able to afford them, taxing the entire international system.
This problem portends massive humanitarian, refugee, and migration consequences
for America.
In the Western hemisphere, Haitian and Cuban migration problems
persist, (48, 000 Haitians legally entered the U.S. last year) and imagine if political
problems languish in for example the PRC. Escaping the human suffering in their
country and/ or striving for the promises of a better life, many more illegal
migrations are expected next century. Many of these people will travel by sea,
insinuating that maritime patrols could be called upon more should this be a
national interest.
Military assets have been employed in the war against drugs for a
number of years now. Operationally, the mission entails intercepting and boarding a
suspected vessel. Clearly, if the mission is deemed to be of national interest,
corvettes could perform the inspection, with much greater cost effectiveness, than
many of the ships presently employed.
Navy Secretary James Forrestal asserted "that among post WW-II strategies, U.S.




Only a handful of UN naval operations have taken place, and aside from the
transporting of goods and /or personnel, and the provision of humanitarian
assistance, naval contributions today can be counted in the following six of 29
peacekeeping (PK) missions (20%) around the world:
UN Transition Assistance Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
UN Protection Force Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR)
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)
UN Operation Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM)
UN OBSERVER GROUP FOR VERIFICATION OF ELECTIONS HAITI
(ONUVEH)
SOLOMON ISLANDS OBSERVER FORCE
A casual glance suggests that the Navy's role is minor; proportionately it is
indeed. But UNPROFOR forces in the Adriatic, UNOSOM units off Somalia, and
ONUVEH ships embargoing Haiti continue to require significant numbers of
warships. The operations are relatively low risk, but cannot be considered risk-free.
But perhaps the greatest risk, and one which the Navy is going to have to become
accustomed, is that of not having enough ships to meet all of the Nation's
commitments. 140
American naval ships are not designed to conduct traditional UN
missions. One might claim that the point is moot, considering the non-maritime
nature of most of the operations (monitoring human rights, promoting democratic
elections, or supervising ceasefires), but consider the motivation behind (ONUVEH).
l40Beyond the mere reduction of ARG/CVBG escorts, various cost savings
measures, some impacting on readiness have been necessary to finance the mission in
Somalia and the Adriatic. Examples include the delay of numerous ship and aircraft
overhauls, and the curtailing of 4th quarter Pacific fleet operations, exercises, and
port visits.
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Who would have guessed that six naval vessels would be called to help restore
democracy. Naval officers do not dictate policy, but if the interest is so deemed,
then corvettes make ideal platforms for some of the missions.
It is crucial to ensure that vessels engaged in peacekeeping (PK) are
adequately prepared. Areas that warrant attention and interoperability include: C4I,
doctrine, rules of engagement (ROE), training and joint exercises, intelligence sharing,
identifying friend or foe measures (IFF), and logistic support. If PK is deemed in the
national interest, corvette design can be tailored to support UN operations.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Forward deployed naval forces are expected to remain the principal military
option for underscoring U.S. foreign policy objectives abroad. This expectation is
based not only on the continuing drawdown of "permanently" based American forces
abroad, but also in recognition of the unique and attractive nature of naval forces,
including: flexibility, responsiveness, endurability, and recallability. But as the
numbers of deployable ships decline, keeping the forward deployment of adequate
numbers of U.S. Navy forces will become increasingly difficult. So-called "adaptive
force packages" are an attempt to solve part of the problem, yet some theater
coverage is increasingly being "gapped."
Lacking unlimited resources, determining the correct number, capability, and
mix of warships is extremely difficult, if not impossible. Part of the dilemma centers
around the question of quality vs. quantity, most notably how to build, maintain, and
operate extremely capable and expensive ships, adequate in number to persevere
during conflict, while also having enough ships to accomplish a myriad of peacetime
commitments.
As large numbers of expensive combatants become less affordable and, in a
sense perhaps, "irreplaceable," their liabilities can outweigh their unparalleled
capabilities. The high cost of procurement and low numbers on scene can influence
the nation's willingness to take risks, and thereby present the operational
commanders with a dilemma: how to fight inshore along the littorals without
jeopardizing the "irreplaceable handful of capital ships. Small, 1,500 ton corvettes
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can offer a solution by way of their ability to apply "appropriate naval force at the
decisive point, at the decisive moment."
Although small combatants are not part of present American naval strategy,
this thesis concludes that small corvettes can carry out several of the wartime roles
and forward presence missions of the future. This conclusion is based on three
interrelated factors: national strategy, fiscal constraints, and emerging or anticipated
technologies. The penalty of building only capital warships is too few for success in
war or availability in peace. A corvette flotilla, as postulated in the thesis, presents a
complementary and necessary balance to the combatant fleet of 2010.
American corvette-size ships can can contribute to or augment the American
commitment abroad, when the military potential and the character of the force
obviously influences and, at times, dictates mission success. TABLE 9 is a synopsis
of several salient points which must be considered as one attempts to find a balance
between requirements, capability, and affordability.
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TABLE 9: (CORVETTE PROS AND CONS)
BENEFITS LIABILITIES
Affordable, more assets on station, Too vulnerable (mothership, C3I link,
and less manning per corvette the corvettes themselves)
Exploits emerging or anticipated technologies, Not multi-mission
with affordable inshore combat power capable
#s of ships most important warship attribute Limited firepower
Flexible fire power distribution Limited staying power
Less costly to build in time, money, and personnel
Allied interoperability with Limited deterrent
minimal ties to host nation
Export potential
The thesis found that the acquisition cost of an eight corvette flotilla, including
a mothership, is about the same as three DDG-51s. The flotilla of eight deployed will
maintain four or five corvettes at sea and on station. Of the three DDGs, only one at
a time would be forward deployed, while the other two are in various stages of
training, transit, or maintenance. Compared with a DDG, a corvette has shorter time
on station, less staying power, the need for a mothership, and other limitations which
are offset by having at least four capable ships, at any one time, in as many different
locations. The flotilla's replacement "Blue / Gold" crew takes over at the end of six
months, providing greater ship utilization, and mitigating the problem of a
decreasing pool of ships and long transit times to AORs.
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Two areas require further investigation in comparing costs. The first relates
to the higher overall personnel manning requirement to maintain a flotilla forward
deployed, and the second involves looking at the cost of maintaining the flotilla
forward deployed. Both of these considerations must be weighed against the benefits
of maintaining eight vice just one ship forward deployed.
There is no doubt that, given the current fiscal environment, any decision to
build corvette flotillas would be made at the cost of some assets presently planned
and funded (for example: three DDG-51s per year). This thesis suggests that a better
plan would be to fund 6 DDGs and one flotilla over a three year period. Another
point to consider is that the estimated $200 million per corvette could be reduced by
using the prototype as a replacement for the aging Coast Guard cutter fleet.
Additionally, a less capable version could also be competitive in the export market.
Corvettes are the ship of choice for a majority of the world's navies.
Small combatants may serve several missions well, but the question which
must be answered, is how they will perform in a high threat environment. Forward
presence implies the need to operate in littoral waters, which poses several unique
challenges due to the proximity to land. Threats to any ship operating close to a
hostile shore will potentially be intense, involving a coordinated, multidirectional,
and multidimensional attack.
Although small surface craft have not fared well since 1980, losses were
typically the result of inadequate state of the art point defense weapons, sensors, or
decoys. By incorporating offship sensor nets (SEW and UAVs), sophisticated tactical
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data systems (TDS), and enhanced weapon suites, the future corvette can overcome
most of these shortcomings. Additionally, the value of the concept in this area is best
measured by the synergistic tactical effectiveness of the flotilla.
Two critical nodes must be protected if the flotilla is to function. The first
concerns the mothership which furnishes almost all of the corvette's sustainment
needs. Although this ship requires a high degree of self protection and staying
power, it will usually remain outside the area(s) of contention. The attractiveness of
the mothership concept is reduced reliance on host nations and/or other fleet assets,
and the opportunity it creates to commit a high percentage of the corvette tonnage to
warfighting tasks. Nonetheless, the loss of a mothership could entail the "catastrophic
degradation" of the flotilla's combat capabilities as a whole. It must be designed with
high staying power and operationally kept out of "harm's way."
The second node concerns the disruption of the external D/T/E sensor net
(UAVs or SEW assets) or the connectivity with the associated data link. Since this is
the primary means to track and engage targets, these "ears and eyes" are critical for
mission success. An effective sensor net is absolutely critical, because with minimal
armor and redundancy, corvettes will usually not survive a direct missile hit. But
then neither will larger combatants, as evidenced during the Falklands Conflict.
Technological innovation has overcome much of the straight-line relationship
between size, capability, and cost. For a relatively low acquisition cost, corvettes
are expected to perform a wide assortment of duties, to include: (1) provide local
ASW and ASUW for an approaching force from the sea; (2) escort high value targets
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(HVTs) near the terminal points of ingress and egress, on oceanic transit, and choke
point operations; (3) support limited TLAM strike operations; (4) provide a landing
and takeoff platform for various small to medium size joint air assets; (5) perform
maritime embargo, blockade, quarantine, and interdiction; (6) participate in multi-
national maritime initiatives; and (7), contribute to a host of non-traditional missions.
Several of the capabilities required to reliably perform these missions do not
presently exist on a ship in the 1,500 ton range. Most, if not all, of the these shortfalls
are probably correctable by 2010, given the necessary policy direction. Major
shortfalls of the current generation of 1,500 ton corvettes include: (1) most small
ships in this range are rarely intended to operate far from the shore for extended
periods of time; (2) the addition of four box-launched TLAMs impacts not only ship
size, stability, and RCS, but increases the vulnerability to the ship should one of the
missiles take a hit; (3) a medium vice small helo launch and recovery capability is
essential; (4) the corvette will rely solely on a VDS for ASW; (5) the primary detect
/ track / engage capability for the flotilla will rely on off ship sources (organic UAVs
and SEW assets); and (6), the postulated crew size is one-half to one-third that of
crew complements on similarly sized ships today. Although informal advice has been
sought from a variety of ship design sources, it remains necessary to determine if the
capabilities are overly optimistic, and if so by how much. A 15 to 20 percent
difference between desired and technically feasible is considered acceptable, whereas
a 50 percent difference would require rethinking applicable portions of the thesis.
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Two technologies which are deemed critical for this concept of forward
deployed flotillas to work are stealth and ASM defense. The flotilla as envisioned,
places a premium on stealth characteristics. The application of stealth is
multidimensional, as several spectrums must be masked, including noise, infrared
(IR) signature, radar cross section (RCS), and wake. As success is met in one area,
potential opponents are likely to concentrate on exploiting weaknesses elsewhere.
The second critical technology concerns the means of defending the ship
against a coordinated and premptive attack by low flying and low observable cruise
missiles. Twn technologies which offer much promise are DSP weapon cueing with
-iW assets d ongoing work involving high altitude, high endurance UAVs (ie:
DARO). These air umbrellas increase the radar horizon range and increase the
reaction time available. Without this capability, tested and reliable, the flotilla
concept is deemed unfeasible.
Just as attractive as the "per unit cost," the numbers of ships is also an
important warship attribute. Throughout naval history, nations have repeatedly re-
discovered the need for small ships to perform a variety of tasks for which larger
lips proved ill-suited. The primary advantage of the corvette flotilla scheme is in
the numbers of the corvettes. These numbers are critical for several aspects of the
presence mission, as the CINC must ensure not only the availability of escorts to
protect the CVBGs, ARGs, and the large vulnerable sealift, but in time require ample
forces that can close within range to affect operations ashore.
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It is necessary to point out that that the proposed corvette "solution" is not to
be confused with Admiral Zumwalt's Hi/Lo concept. This postulated corvette is
intended to steam in front, leading the fight in littoral waters. The "lo" is not set too
low, and the dispersion of the flotilla spreads the risk to the corvette force, a factor
which could prove invaluable in a coastal scenario where the probability of loss to
surprise attack is high, even for a "high-mix" DDG. Should the national interest
deem it necessary, the flotilla could lower the overall cost in dollars and lives.
When comparing warship attributes in today's uncertain environment, the
attribute which is consistently the most advantageous in force-on-force engagements
is the number of combat units, with the combat advantage of numbers applying
under a wide set of circumstances. This and the "expanding cumulative advantage,"
demonstrates why the commander is better off with twice as many units of force than
with units of twice the rate of offensive and defensive firepower.
Because of the military potential of an eight ship flotilla, an adversary can ill
afford to neglect any ship as each unit has the firepower to engage four of the
enemy. Because of better C3I, corvettes provide the capability to inflict damage more
than their apparent weight would suggest. Just as ship of the line tactics in the past
called upon concentrated firepower by steaming in tight columnar formations, the
flotilla's effectiveness depends on the synergistic and cooperative engagement from
the whole force.
Numbers are great, but what about the corvette's limited firepower,
endurance, and staying power? Operating forward on a long tether places
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tremendous stress on both the ship and the crew. Ship endurance is measured not
only by gallons of fuel per mile, but more importantly by crew limitations (stores and
especially rest) and maintenance requirements (spare parts and repair time). After
considering all of these factors, the thesis finds it feasible for an eight ship flotilla to
maintain at least four to five ships on station, around the clock, at distances
extending up to 200 miles from the mother ship.
Two warfare areas in which the corvette's contribution is negligible are air
superiority and naval gunfire support (NGFS). Should a formidable air threat be
present, the flotilla would require external anti-air assets to augment the force.
Would corvettes prompt an adversary to build up air forces to overcome this
relative weakness? The answer is not clear. Nevertheless, corvettes possess soft and
hard kill anti-air systems, designed for adequate point defense.
The second shortcoming concerns the 76 mm gun, which is less than optimal
for NGFS. Experiments are being conducted with vertical-launched fire support
missiles (ie: 160 mile ATACMS), which could prove an option worth considering.
Other than onboard ordnance, the corvette can shuttle various air assault packages,
UAVs, and SH-60s with a variety of cannons, missiles, and various countermeasure
payloads.
The corvette flotilla may not carry a large number of weapons in the
magazines, but given the advantages offered by better C4I, the corvettes are expected
to maximize the effect offered by their wide assortment of weapons. Replenishing
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the armament for the force after an engagement is a factor not explored, but
acknowledged.
American interests are so intertwined and interdependent with other nations,
that engagement with the rest of the world, and world politics will remain essential.
Despite the glitches that multinational operations have encountered recently in
Somalia and the Balkans, they are expected to increase in light of the downsizing of
American military forces. On a maritime dimension, corvettes offer compatibility with
foreign navies without sacrificing capability.
Corvettes are ideal platforms to compel or deter, recognizing the inherent
limitations of deterrence and compellence. It is concluded that since a flotilla of
corvettes usually will not tilt the local balance of forces, they are not suitable for
immediate-extended deterrence. Of course this depends on the quality of the
aggressor relative to the protege. Overall, the flotilla can contribute to general
deterrence.
Forward deployed flotillas eliminate transit times which equates to quicker
response. Because of the flotilla's "advantage in numbers," the adversary's decision
making process is greatly complicated, since he no longer can concentrate on just a
few platforms. Each corvette impacts the campaign in some way, raising the cost and
risk for the adversary. Corvettes can be sent in and fight where the risk is high.
Port calls and multi-national exercises are indicators of goodwill, friendship,
and cooperation, but when national resolve or capability are perceived to be weak,
then forward deployed forces may encounter challenges. In the past, such
109
perceptions have instilled overconfidence in aggressors, led to miscalculation by all
sides, and eventually inspired numerous actions, that at the time, were considered
low-risk. In this light, the flotilla is viewed as a fighting force that signals an
appreciation of the needs and realities of the time, and demonstrates that the United
States desires to remain globally engaged. It must be remembered that corvettes
maintain a qualitative edge with their SEW and UAV supported detect, track, and
engagement capability, but their air defenses are intended solely for point defense.
The flotilla can be a force multiplier, augmenting the CINCs concentration of forces
in both time and space.
This thesis touched on the nature of forward military naval operations, as the
Nation must ask how far forward, and determine whether presence actually stabilizes
or escalates a crisis or arms build-up. Corvette flotillas can not do everything
expected of forward deployed naval units, but they do provide a necessary balance
between requirements, capability, and affordability. Each of these goals are
important to the Nation as a whole, and can be accomplished without sacrificing
American military tactical advantage or strategic commitment as a world leader.
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